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Article

Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions
Erik Hovenkamp* & Thomas F. Cotter†
INTRODUCTION
Patent rights reflect a deliberate tradeoff of “static” (shortterm) for “dynamic” (long-term) efficiency.1 Governments grant
patents knowing full well that in doing so they may be conferring some degree of monopoly power2 because, while this is
economically detrimental in the short-run,3 it may nevertheless
promote overall efficiency by spurring innovation sufficient to
* Ph.D. Candidate (economics) and J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University Department of Economics and Northwestern University School of Law.
† Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School. I thank the University of Minnesota Law School for a summer research grant. In addition, we thank Herb Hovenkamp, Mark Lemley, and
Douglas Melamed; participants at the I.P. Scholars Conference at DePaul
University and at the Annual Conference of the Western Economics Association International; and students in Professor Claire Hill’s Law and Economics
Seminar for their comments and criticism. Any errors that remain are ours.
Copyright © 2016 by Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter.
1. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement
Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1597 (2011) (“Economic analysis of patent law frequently begins with the assertion that patents present a
social tradeoff between providing incentives for innovation at the expense of
accepting the deadweight loss associated with monopoly-like exclusive
rights.”); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 276 (2012) (“The classic economic analysis of
intellectual property posits a tradeoff between static costs and dynamic benefits.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1500 (2002) (“Patent policy
embodies a tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency.”).
2. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual
Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 486–87 (2006). Courts no longer
presume that patents confer market power because, in fact, most patents are
never used or licensed and even those that are often compete with a range of
potential substitutes. Some patents do confer market power, however, and it is
the potential (even if, ex ante, unlikely) prospect of this outcome that is presumed to motivate firms to invest in R&D. See id. at 486.
3. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 18 (2005).
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offset the social costs of temporarily suppressed competition.4
Of course, a promise of exclusive rights to an invention is vacuous without a mechanism for enforcement, and thus it is ultimately patent remedies that lay the groundwork for the incentive problem at the heart of patent policy. It is therefore curious
that, in deciding whether to grant an injunction for the infringement of a patent (as opposed to awarding an ongoing royalty instead) courts focus on the immediate hardships an injunction might impose on the litigants and the public, but not
on a consideration that is far more relevant to the patent system’s goal of promoting dynamic welfare: namely, the extent to
which the ability to exclude competitors was a necessary inducement for the plaintiff’s decision to bring its products to
market.5 In this Article, we present a simple economic model
showing that, under certain identifiable conditions, courts
should deny injunctions because the exclusion of infringing
competitors will reduce static consumer welfare without any
corresponding dynamic efficiency gain.
Our analysis leads to two key insights that are relevant to
a broad range of cases at the core of contemporary patent policy
debates. The first is that it is sometimes possible to conclude
that injunctive relief for patent infringement will result in an
unambiguous social welfare loss, based upon inferences that
reasonably can be drawn from the fact that a firm entered a
product market unprotected by any expectation of being able to
enjoin competitors using the technology in question.6 The second is to develop a theory of a heretofore unexplored7 business
4. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHRESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION xi, 8–11,
14, 241–42 (2012) (noting that the long-term welfare gains from innovation are
likely substantially higher than the short-term welfare gains derived from the
elimination of anticompetitive market conditions); Josh Lerner, The Patent
System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPO J. 28, 32 (2010) (noting that, while there
are some dissenters, most economists “would agree that some intellectual
property protection is better than no intellectual property protection at all,”
while recognizing that “this does not mean that very strong protection is better than a more moderate level of protection”).
5. See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
6. In this regard, our analysis parallels that of Abramowicz and Duffy,
who argue that in deciding whether an invention was patentably nonobvious
the Patent Office and the courts should consider whether, absent the patent
incentive, the invention “would not have been disclosed or devised for a substantial period of time.” See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1599.
Roughly speaking, our analysis asks whether, absent the ability to enjoin infringers, the patent owner would have entered the market anyway.
7. While unexplored in patent law, the underlying strategy has been adOUT
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model that is becoming increasingly common and that we refer
to as the “diagonally integrated” nonpracticing entity (NPE),8
which is a producer that acquires patents it does not practice,
but which competes with some downstream firms that use (or
could potentially use) those patented technologies. Such firms
seek neither to use nor to license on reasonable terms the acquired patents, a strategy that largely serves to exclude these
technologies from the marketplace. As a consequence, diagonally integrated NPEs impose much greater social welfare costs
than do more conventional types of NPEs. These insights provide valuable implications concerning a number of widely scrutinized contemporary patent issues, including the consequences
of making commitments to license standard-essential patents
(SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND)
terms; patent privateering; and preemptive patenting.
To illustrate, consider the facts of a recent Federal Circuit
decision, Trebro Manufacturing, Inc. v. FireFly Equipment,
L.L.C.9 The patents in suit relate to a type of agricultural vehidressed in antitrust. This disparity is not surprising given the courts’ inconsistent approaches to competition policy within and outside the patent context,
which effectively leaves them with one silo for patent law and a second silo for
antitrust. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 272
(2008) (“[S]trategic acquisition and nonuse of patents are unlawful monopolization if they restrain competition unreasonably.”); see also Kobe, Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424 (10th Cir. 1952) (explaining that the
dominant firm’s acquisition and nonuse of an important patent could violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
8. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9. 748 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A much older case that involved largely the same fact pattern as Trebro is Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). As in Trebro, a firm with a large market
share purchased a patent from a third party, did not use or license it, and
sought injunctive relief against another firm that allegedly infringed the patent. See id. at 406. The Supreme Court held that the patent owner was under
no duty to use the patent and that, because the defendant’s device infringed
under patent law’s doctrine of equivalents, injunctive relief was appropriate.
See id. at 422–30; see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 295–98
(discussing, among other things, the Paper Bag plaintiff’s acquisition of the
patent from the inventor). Bohannan and Hovenkamp argue more broadly
that courts generally should not grant injunctive relief to nonusing patent
owners, but in addition they argue that “the Paper Bag rule is catastrophically
negative” when the infringement is inadvertent, “when the shelf life of the patented invention is shorter than the term of the patent,” and “when the acquirer is a dominant firm, or monopolist, and the acquisition serves to maintain a monopoly in a market that would otherwise have been competitive.”
BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 298. The authors also recommend
that antitrust enforcers limit market-dominant firms to acquiring only nonexclusive patent licenses. See id. at 293; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
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cle known as a “sod harvester,” and the market for these devices consists of only three firms: patent owner Trebro, Brouwer
Turf Inc., and a new entrant, FireFly.10 In 2013, a company affiliated with Brouwer sold Trebro the two patents in suit, in exchange for which Trebro canceled a debt owed by Brouwer and
granted Brouwer a royalty-free, nonexclusive license to the two
patents; Trebro itself, however, does not use the patented technology in any of the harvesters it sells.11 Shortly after acquiring
the patents Trebro filed suit against FireFly, alleging that
FireFly’s “ProSlab 150” harvesters, which compete against Trebro’s unpatented “SC2010” model, infringe the patents.12
Before the matter proceeded to trial, Trebro moved for a
preliminary injunction, which the district court denied on the
ground that Trebro was unlikely to succeed on the merits and
had not succeeded in proving irreparable harm.13 With respect
to this latter issue, the court concluded that an award of damages in the form of lost profits or a reasonable royalty would
fully compensate Trebro if it were to prevail at trial.14 On interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s
order denying the injunction, first because in the appellate
court’s view Trebro’s patent likely was valid and infringed,15
and second because “[t]he district court clearly erred in finding
as speculative the harm Trebro is likely to suffer if its direct
IP AND ANTITRUST § 14.3c (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting nonexclusive patent licenses as a solution to “competitive objections to intellectual property acquisitions by dominant firms”). In Trebro, this would have meant that Brouwer
Turf would have retained ownership of, and the right to sue for the infringement of, the patent. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 168 (licensors have
standing to sue, while nonexclusive licensees do not). We have no quarrel with
this reasoning, but our analysis provides an additional set of reasons for denying injunctions in cases like Paper Bag or Trebro, and as discussed in Part III
also casts light on other recurring situations that do not necessarily involve
acquisition of a patent from a third party or the patent owner’s market dominance. Finally, we would note that, as a doctrinal matter, although the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006), does not explicitly overrule Paper Bag, it greatly restricts the reach of
that decision. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing eBay).
10. See Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1164, 1170.
11. See id. at 1162, 1164, 1171.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1164–65. Under the applicable law, the moving party “must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at
1165 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
14. See id.
15. Id. at 1166–70.
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competitor is able to sell an infringing product in the small,
niche sod harvester market.”16 In the court’s view, FireFly’s allegedly infringing sales not only cost Trebro corresponding
sales of its unpatented SC2010 harvesters, but (due to the durability of the products and the size of the market) also result
in a loss of customers and substantial market share, which
Trebro is unlikely to recover.17 The fact that Trebro’s products
themselves do not use Trebro’s ‘638 Patent does not detract
from this harm.18 The court then remanded for consideration of
the remaining preliminary injunction factors (balance of harms
and public interest), noting however that the “patent will have
significantly less value if Trebro cannot use it to exclude an infringing product” and suggesting that because the market is
small an injunction “may not have a broad-reaching effect.”19
As the court noted, Trebro is hardly the first case in which
the Federal Circuit has stated that a patent owner whose own
products do not embody its patented invention may obtain an
injunction against a competitor whose products allegedly do
embody that invention.20 By contrast, in cases in which the patent owner makes no products—that is, in which the owner is a
nonpracticing entity (NPE)21—U.S. courts since the Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.22 are likely to deny preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, on the
ground (among others) that infringement does not threaten the
NPE with “irreparable” harm.23 This follows from the fact that,
16. Id. at 1170.
17. Id. at 1170–71.
18. Id. at 1171.
19. Id. at 1171–72.
20. See id. at 1171 (citing Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm
Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 702–03 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
21. The terms “patent assertion entity” (PAE), “patent monetization entity” (PME), and “patent troll” generally refer to NPEs that obtain patents from
their original owners for the purpose of enforcing them against alleged infringers. For discussion of the many different types of NPEs in the contemporary marketplace, see, for example, Malte Köllner & Paul Weber, Trolls and
Their Consequences—An Evolving IP Ecosystem, 3 MITTEILUNGEN DER
DEUTSCHEN PATENTANWÄLTE 106 (2014); Raymond Millien, Landscape 2013:
Who Are the Players in the IP Marketplace?, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/01/23/ip-landscape/id=33356.
22. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
23. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC,
and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2013) (reporting that,
from July 2006 to August 2011, prevailing PAEs obtained permanent injunctions in 26% of cases (5 of 19), compared with a 75% rate for all patentees, and

876

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:871

unlike Trebro and other practicing entities, NPEs generally
have no interest in excluding competitors, since NPEs produce
and sell no products themselves and typically are willing to license their patents for the right price.
Nevertheless, we argue that Trebro is best viewed as a type
of NPE—more specifically, a “diagonally integrated” NPE that
uses its idle patents to impair or exclude firms from competing
against the products the diagonally integrated firm does produce24—and that entry of an injunction on the specific facts of
Trebro undermines the public interest in competition, without
any offsetting social benefit. More precisely, in Part I below we
present a simple economic model showing that, where a firm (1)
enters a product market without any protection against competing technologies; (2) makes and sells goods embodying unprotected technology a; and (3) acquires from a third party but
does not use a patent covering a competing technology b, granting that firm an injunction against an infringer’s unauthorized
use of technology b to market competing products creates an
unambiguous static welfare loss that cannot be justified by any
potential gains to dynamic efficiency.25
Significantly, two main points that emerge from our model
have implications that extend far beyond the narrow facts of
Trebro. The first is that, when it is possible to infer that a firm
was willing to enter a market unprotected by a right to enjoin
competitors, it is often appropriate to deny the firm injunctive
relief against patent infringement. Trebro is an example of
such a case, but as we explain in Part II the fact that a firm
was willing to make an unprotected market entry also makes it
appropriate to deny injunctive relief in two other classes of casthat the rate is only 7% for PAEs in cases in which the injunction was contested). NPEs that are not PAEs, however, including individuals and universities,
“have enjoyed higher-than-average injunction-grant rates” than other NPEs.
Id. at 10. The U.S. International Trade Commission, however, provides a parallel forum for some patent infringement disputes, and may exclude infringing
imports; it is not bound by the eBay rule. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
24. See Richard S. Higgins, Diagonal Merger, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 609,
610 (1997) (coining the term “diagonal merger”).
25. Note that we are not talking about a firm that makes an unprotected
entry into the market for product a while it is working on, or seeking patent
protection for, a technology that is embodied in product a. Market pressures
often compel firms to begin commercializing their technology before they have
succeeded in obtaining legal protection for that technology, and nothing in our
analysis demonstrates that denying these firms injunctions would increase
social welfare.
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es that feature in contemporary patent policy debates, namely
actions filed by patent “privateers”26 and cases involving the alleged infringement of FRAND-encumbered SEPs.27 Our analysis also sheds some light, albeit less conclusively, on the perennial question of whether courts should grant injunctive relief
when the patentee allegedly has engaged in “preemptive” patenting—that is, patenting for the purpose of excluding competitors from using a technology the patent owner itself does not
intend to use.28
Part III develops the second key point to emerge from the
model, namely, that diagonally integrated NPEs can give rise
to serious but, up until now largely unappreciated, social welfare costs. Circumstances formally identical to those found in
Trebro are in fact becoming increasingly common, with practicing entities acquiring existing patents not for purposes of their
own use, but rather for the purpose of exclusion or licensing.
Our model shows that ownership by a diagonally integrated
NPE generally results in higher licensing fees and more aggressive litigation in pursuit of injunctive relief than would be
26. “Privateering” is the term used when a practicing entity assigns patents to a nonpracticing third party who then seeks to enforce the patents. The
third-party “privateer” then distributes a portion of the resulting proceeds
back to the assignor, in accordance with the terms of the assignment. See infra
Part II.A.
As noted above, since the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision, courts
generally have been reluctant to grant injunctive relief to PAEs—and as we
will see, privateers for the most part are a species of PAE. Nevertheless, our
analysis provides some additional reasons why courts should resist granting
privateers injunctive relief, which may prove useful in specific cases in this
country as well as in jurisdictions outside the United States where the eBay
rule has yet to take hold.
27. Standards setting organizations (SSOs) such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) typically require members to disclose any patents that might read on a standard under consideration, to “declare” any patents that are essential to the practice of the chosen standard,
and to commit to license those patents on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory”
(RAND) or “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) terms. See, e.g.,
RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, U.S. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., A STUDY
OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS
SETTING
ORGANIZATIONS
WORLDWIDE
48–99
(2012),
http://sites
.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.pdf.
In contemporary practice, RAND and FRAND are used interchangeably,
though as of 2014 FRAND seems to be on its way toward becoming the more
common usage. For discussion, see infra Part II.B.
28. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 248–50; Roger D. Blair &
Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1,
77–78 (2001).
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the case if the patents were owned by conventional “unintegrated” NPEs, which (again) typically are interested in licensing, not exclusion. Counterintuitively, conventional NPEs may
pose less of a threat to short- and long-term consumer welfare
than do their diagonally integrated counterparts. They also
create welfare harms that would not arise if they were practicing entities with respect to the disputed patent. Diagonally integrated NPEs are thus distinct from both practicing entities
and traditional, unintegrated NPEs.
I. UNPROTECTED MARKET ENTRY
The principal ambition of the patent system is not to reward inventors, nor is it to extract compensation from those
who reap the benefits of others’ ideas. Rather, its aim is to induce innovative activity that would not arise if new inventions
were unprotected from the forces of open competition. The protections afforded by patents are merely the inducements we use
to achieve this goal.29 In this way, the protections provided by a
particular patent are socially valuable only to the extent that
they were necessary to induce the patentee’s innovative ef-

29. To be sure, some scholars have proposed noneconomic theories of patent rights, premised for example on the inventor’s investment of labor in developing a new invention, or on the argument that property rights, including
intellectual property rights, assist us in realizing greater personal autonomy.
See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). In
another work, however, one of us has expressed skepticism over the wisdom of
taking such noneconomic rationales into account in formulating patent policy.
See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and Intellectual Property Law, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 211, 221–24 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013). There also are other proposed economic justifications,
including Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267–71 (1977) (arguing that patents enable inventors to efficiently coordinate the development of
an inventive “prospect”). Scholars are divided on the merits of the prospect
theory. See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27 (2013) (noting some of the relevant literature).
But even if one believes that patents sometimes may serve Kitch’s prospect
function, and that injunctive relief is vital to their ability to do so, see Kitch,
supra, at 286–87, in the cases we discuss herein the social benefits of prospecting would have to be very substantial indeed in order to outweigh the social
welfare losses resulting from the granting of injunctions; and this seems unlikely if, as in our examples, the patent owner clearly is not using the patent to
coordinate follow-up improvements but rather merely to exclude competition
or to extract royalties. In any event, the rationale described in the text
above—that patents encourage the creation and disclosure of new inventions—remains the dominant justification for the patent system, and the one
to which we will devote our attention.
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forts.30 Any protections provided in excess of this amount are
unnecessary, and their exercise engenders a social loss. However, this point is often lost in the course of evaluating injunctive
relief as a remedy for infringement. The courts instead focus
myopically on ascertaining and comparing the hardships of the
litigants and the public at large,31 leading them to ignore the
question most relevant to the patent system’s ambitions: Did
the plaintiff’s decision to develop its patented technology hinge
on its ability to exclude infringers32 like the defendant?33 This

30. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1593–603 (arguing that an
inducement framework should guide the analysis of whether an invention was
nonobvious).
31. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“[A]
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction . . . must demonstrate: (1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.”). The eBay factors do not explicitly require courts to consider the plaintiff’s innovation incentive, though courts
sometimes do refer to the public interest in “the enforcement of patent rights
to promote the ‘encouragement of investment-based risk.’” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting SanofiSynthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006)), aff’d in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal
Circuit has cautioned, however, this interest “must also be weighed with other
aspects of the public interest.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d
1352, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the text above, we propose that, in appropriate
circumstances, courts should take into account, as part of the public interest
analysis, whether an injunction is necessary to preserve innovation incentives.
32. Throughout this Article we restrict attention to unintentional infringements—independently invented technologies that happen to read on the
patent in question. Permitting injunctions of willful infringements will more
often be necessary, as this serves to mitigate the free-riding problem that
would arise if intentional copying were not adequately deterred. That is, if intentional copiers are simply made to pay damages, they may choose to do so
rather than developing their own ideas. Thus, injunctions of intentional infringers may be necessary to preserve the incentive to innovate among potential defendants. Concededly, though, there may be some difficulties in determining what “unintentional infringement” means or should mean in some
contexts, for example where the defendant could have uncovered the patent by
means of a reasonable pre-use search. See COTTER, supra note 29, at 62 n.47;
Thomas F. Cotter, The Comparative Law and Eonomics of Standard-Essential
Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 344 n.148
(2014). Be that as it may, some evidence suggests that intentional copying is
much less common than unintentional infringement. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1462–
64 (2008).
33. Of course, the plaintiff is not always the inventor or the inventor’s
employer. If instead the plaintiff is a non-practicing entity (NPE) who ac-
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Article demonstrates that there are some circumstances in
which we can deduce that the answer is no. In these situations
there is no policy justification for awarding an injunction, no
matter the magnitude of the plaintiff’s injury. Instead, as discussed below, the court should apply a liability rule34 and
award an ongoing royalty in place of injunctive relief.
The importance of identifying when injunctive relief is unwarranted stems from its particularly harmful impact on static
(short-run) welfare, that is, the level of consumer or social welfare that is associated with the present state of the market,
given the products currently available. To the extent that, in
the short run, there are no readily available noninfringing alternatives that the defendant can substitute for the patented
invention, this impact is threefold. First, an injunction dampens competition by effectively excluding the defendant from the
relevant product market, thus enabling any remaining firms

quired the patent, then this question centers on whether the original inventor’s development decision idea hinged on his ability to sell to an NPE, and to
do so at the higher price the patent would command when this NPE retains
the right to enjoin infringers and thus extract some portion of the switching
cost the defendant otherwise would incur ex post if it were to design around
the patented technology. In a companion paper, one of us argues that, in principle, enabling the patent owner to extract the defendant’s avoided switching
costs results in a reward that is presumptively disproportionate to the invention’s social value. See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, A New
Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 FLA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10–11), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2528616. Nevertheless, even if the patentee’s ultimate interest is (as
it is for many NPEs) to license the invention to, rather than to exclude, the
defendant, and the incentive to invent would not be impaired by preventing
the patentee from extracting switching costs, injunctive relief may be optimal
if a court’s calculation of an ongoing royalty would generate adjudication and
error costs that exceed the social cost of enabling the patent owner to extract
the switching costs. See COTTER, supra note 29, at 53–55 (arguing that, even
when the patent owner’s ultimate interest resides in licensing its invention,
protecting intellectual property rights by means of a property rule may economize on adjudication and error costs by capitalizing on the parties’ presumptive advantage, in comparison with a court, in estimating patent value).
Alternatively, in some cases the product the plaintiff markets and which
the injunction shields from competition is not covered by the patent in suit.
This is what happened in Trebro, where the court held that an injunction
might be proper to protect the plaintiff’s competing but uninfringed product.
See Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir.
2014). In such situations, the relevant question is whether the inventor of the
patented technology would have developed that technology absent the ability
of the plaintiff to shield its unpatented product from competition by excluding
users of the patented technology.
34. See infra note 41.
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(including the plaintiff) to increase price and reduce output. (In
a case like Trebro, where there are only three firms in the entire market and the defendant is a new entrant,35 this effect
could be quite significant.) Second, by eliminating a distinct
product variety from the market, the injunction forces many
consumers to settle for their second favorite product. Third, the
defendant may be effectively barred from using not only the infringing technology, but also any of its own intellectual property that is incorporated into the infringing product, unless such
complementary intellectual property can be deployed for other
purposes. By contrast, an injunction in a dispute between
neighboring landowners will typically not inhibit the defendant’s ability to use and enjoy the undisputed portions of his
own property, nor is the injunction likely to have a substantial
impact on nonparties.
Despite their harmful effects on static welfare, injunctions
nevertheless may be optimal in those cases where they serve to
substantially promote dynamic (long-run) welfare, which takes
into account not only the present state of the market, but also
the innovative activities that lead to the introduction of new
and improved products over time. This boils down to the fact
that some potential inventors would not develop their new ideas unless they were assured that they could enjoin infringers.
This is most likely to occur in situations where a technology is
expensive to develop, but costs comparatively little to reproduce
thereafter.36 Under these circumstances injunctive relief is effi35. See Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1164, 1170.
36. In such a case, the expected advantage of being the first in the market
with a new invention may not be adequate to motivate the development of the
invention in the first place. Conceivably, other mechanisms such as trade secret may suffice in some cases, though these often entail greater risk to the
inventor and/or greater disadvantages to the public (less disclosure, for example). See COTTER, supra note 29, at 26–27. Of course, in some instances the
inventor’s ultimate interest lies not in excluding competition, as posited in the
text above, but rather in licensing it to a more efficient manufacturer or distributor. In these cases, the principal social benefit of injunctive relief, to be
balanced against the corresponding social costs, may be to conserve on adjudication and error costs. See supra note 33.
Note, however, that an inventor’s interest in enjoining infringers does not
necessarily imply that the inventor is a practicing entity. Small or universitybased inventors, for example, may lack the ability (manufacturing capacity,
know-how, etc.) to successfully bring a new product to market, in which case it
is more efficient to license production to someone else. See COTTER, supra note
29, at 45 (arguing more generally that licensing is efficient when the inventor’s marginal cost of producing or marketing the invention is higher than a
prospective licensee’s). In such cases, a right to enjoin infringers enables the
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cient, because it is better to have a product market that is noncompetitive than to have no market at all. This is the critical
tradeoff that motivates the patent system.
If, however, the circumstances of a particular case indicate
that the plaintiff would have entered the market even absent
the possibility of enjoining infringers, then it is best not to
award an injunction. This way we avoid the static problems of
injunctive relief without compromising dynamic welfare. In
fact, if an inventor did not view injunctive relief as an essential
protection when he chose to develop his idea, then he should be
denied an injunction even if he ultimately confronts unexpectedly injurious competition that, if anticipated, would have led
him to reevaluate the essentiality of injunctive relief. Indeed,
awarding injunctions to these unlucky plaintiffs would do nothing for dynamic welfare: it would not bring any more inventions
to market than would have arrived otherwise because, by hypothesis, these inventors would have developed their products
either way.37 In truth, development of an untested product is
always a gamble; the patent system seeks to persuade an inventor to place his bet, not to ensure that he wins.
Importantly, this incentive-based approach to injunctive
relief would not deter any future inventors from developing
their ideas. Indeed, it signals to a prospective innovator that he
will be denied an injunction only if his idea is so promising that
its development will be profitable even in lieu of the right to exinventor to determine which person or persons to license and which to exclude.
Often the inventor will be better off licensing the patent to one or more selected users on an exclusive basis, rather than negotiating nonexclusive licenses
with all prospective users. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 203–06.
Thus, the fact that the inventor has chosen to license one or more persons to
practice the invention is not sufficient, by itself, to compel the inference that
the prospect of obtaining injunctive relief against some unauthorized users
was immaterial to the decision to invent. Allowing the inventor to enjoin infringers who interfere with the inventor’s interest in exclusive licensing therefore may preserve the patent incentive and thus promote long-run efficiency.
Finally, even in a case in which the inventor ultimately is willing to license an alleged infringer, the ability to threaten injunctive relief may enable
the inventor to extract a higher royalty than otherwise would be the case. See
infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part II, however, we
are skeptical whether this consequence of a right to injunctive relief promotes
dynamic efficiency.
37. The possibility that such actors might be risk averse does not undermine the optimality of this rule. This is because the rule is subjective: a specific plaintiff should be denied an injunction under this rule only if, given the
way he viewed his own prospects, he would have developed his idea even without retaining the right to enjoin infringers.
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clude infringers. In this way, the rule impacts only those inventors hoping to get what they want, and not simply what they
need. As a result, the only real concern with such a rule is that
it will often be impossible to implement. That is, in most patent
disputes the court will be unable to ascertain the plaintiff’s incentives at the time of invention. However, we show that there
are a number of situations in which we can infer an inventor’s
non-reliance on injunctive relief from his actions and the circumstances under which his invention entered the market.
It is also worth noting that this approach to evaluating injunctive relief does not rely on the plaintiff’s ability to foresee
the infringement in question at the time of invention. That is,
we do not assume the plaintiff affirmatively considered the possibility of confronting the specific infringement at issue. In reality an innovator will typically be unable to foresee all possible
infringements that might arise; the same is true of her ability
to foresee future noninfringing but competing technologies. Rather we ask whether, given whatever preconceptions the inventor had about the competing products she might face, the decision to develop the invention did not hinge on the ability to
enjoin any such products that happen to read on her patent.38
This is likely to be true whenever competitors can readily invent around the patent without materially compromising product quality, as in this case the inventor enters the market
knowing she will likely face noninfringing competition that is
just as harmful as true infringement.
To formalize our theory, we analyze a very simple economic
model illustrating the relevant tradeoffs that determine the
suitability of injunctive relief. The model surrounds the problem the courts face in deciding whether to employ a liability
rule or a property rule in a given patent dispute. A liability rule
does not enable a property holder to prevent others from violating her property rights; it merely entitles her to receive compensation for any such violations.39 Under this rule, a firm may
infringe a rival’s patent without fear of being enjoined, but the

38. Recall that this Article restricts attention to unintentional infringements, so this boils down to the question of whether the inventor was willing
to compete with independently invented infringements, which are less likely to
be perfect copies of the invention. See supra note 32 (noting this paper’s focus
on unintentional infringements).
39. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1972).
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courts will force it to pay damages to the patent holder. Under
a property rule, the patent holder is entitled to absolute control
over its patented technology, and any firm that practices its patent without permission may be enjoined as a matter of
course.40 Importantly, an inventor will always prefer to have a
property rule, because this maximizes the value of her property
right. Even if she does not intend, ultimately, to use an injunction to exclude the defendant’s product from the market, she
can threaten to enforce the injunction in order to secure a larger licensing fee than a court might be inclined to award, under
a liability rule regime, as an ongoing, postjudgment royalty.41
Indeed, she can leverage the order to extract the largest
amount that the defendant would willingly pay in order to continue operating.42 We will refer to a royalty negotiated in the
shadow of a threatened injunction as a “supracompensatory”
40. Id.
41. This assumes that the damages awarded under a liability rule, for
both past and future infringement, are not so high as to, in effect, replicate an
award of injunctive relief. As for past infringement, when courts award damages in the form of reasonable royalties the standard framework calls for them
to estimate the royalty the parties would have agreed to ex ante, before the
infringement began. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In a case in which the patentee’s interest would be
served by excluding rather than licensing the infringer, however, there is no
amount the parties really would have agreed to ex ante. The patentee would
have demanded more than the infringer would have been willing to pay, and
typically would seek an award of lost profits instead. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 55–58, 231, 251–52. As for future infringement, the Federal Circuit has instructed district courts post-eBay to “take into account the change
in the parties’ bargaining positions, and the resulting change in economic circumstances, resulting from the determination of liability” in determining the
amount of an ongoing, postjudgment royalty. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517
F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
If, as we argue above, there are cases in which an award of injunctive relief unambiguously would reduce social welfare, courts in such cases should
modify the manner in which they award damages for both past and future infringement to ensure that the damages they award do not simply replicate the
effect of a right to exclude. In practical terms, this would mean awarding reasonable royalties (not lost profits) for past infringement and an ongoing royalty for future infringement, with both measures calculated so that the effect of
paying the award does not effectively result in the infringer’s exclusion from
the market. We may address this issue in greater detail in future work.
42. This amount may reflect the defendant’s sunk costs and its ex post
costs of switching to an alternative technology, neither of which has any obvious bearing on the value of the technology. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al.,
Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 619–21
(2007); Jay Pil Choi, FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential
Patents 9–10 (CESifo Working Paper No. 5012, Oct. 2014), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2512789.
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royalty; by definition it exceeds the royalty the parties would
have negotiated prior to the defendant’s having incurred costs
in reliance on its use of the infringing technology.43
Consider a firm-inventor with an idea for a new patentable
technology, a. The firm must incur a fixed cost of C(a) in order
to develop the technology and bring it to market. Developing
this technology is not the only activity in which it conceivably
invests its resources. For example, it might alternatively neglect to develop any new ideas and simply focus on continuing
to market the products it has already developed. Thus the firm
will only develop the technology if it will yield a net profit that
exceeds its “reservation value,” denoted R, which is simply the
value of the most profitable thing it could do other than developing technology a. If the firm decides to apply for a patent and
bring the product to market, the profit it earns will depend on
whether its property right is protected by a property rule or a
liability rule. The firm’s expected profit is equal to ΠL(a) under
a liability rule and to ΠP(a) under a property rule, where ΠP(a)
> ΠL(a). Thus a patentee always prefers a property rule.44 By
contrast, courts should prefer a liability rule whenever that
rule is sufficient to uphold the dynamic interests of the patent
system, because monetary damages do not produce the static
welfare injuries imposed by injunctive relief.45 Thus the court
will want to impose a property rule only if a liability rule would
have been insufficient to induce the firm to bring its product to
market. This possibility is stated in condition (C1).
(C1) ΠP(a) – C(a) ≥ R > ΠL(a) – C(a)
By contrast, the court prefers to limit the firm to a liability
rule if this alone would have been sufficient to induce its devel43. See Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 471 & n.18 (2014).
44. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
45. Note, however, that awarding an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction may generate otherwise avoidable adjudication and error costs. See supra
note 33. But when a patentee enforces an injunction to exclude a competitor
but would have entered the market even in the absence of a right to injunctive
relief, it is reasonable to assume that the social costs of exclusion (higher prices, lower output, and limited consumer choice) outweigh the social costs of
crafting an appropriate ongoing royalty. In such a case, an ongoing royalty reduces deadweight loss and causes no harm to dynamic efficiency, so whatever
costs are incurred to determine the royalty mostly fall only on the parties
themselves.
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opment. This is embodied in condition (C2).
(C2) ΠP(a) – C(a) > ΠL(a) – C(a) ≥ R
There is an obvious problem here. Every plaintiff has an
incentive to claim its situation is described by (C1), but the variables that comprise the above conditions are almost certainly
not measurable by the courts. Even if courts could reliably estimate the firm’s profits and costs, there is almost surely no
means of assessing the plaintiff’s reservation value. Unless
there is some alternative information that might shed light on
the inventor’s ex ante prospects, the courts lack any way to determine whether an injunction is necessary to promote the dynamic interests of the patent system. It is perhaps because this
information is so often unobtainable that the courts have relegated themselves to a standard under which the plaintiff’s incentives at the time of invention are typically not even considered.
Fortunately, these uncertainties are not always a roadblock. There are a number of circumstances in which courts
may reliably infer that injunctive relief is unnecessary to promote dynamic welfare. To address the first such possibility, we
present two definitions. First, we say a firm engages in unprotected market entry with respect to a technology b if it enters
the relevant product market without any legal protection
against competing products utilizing technology b, and without
materially relying on the possibility of acquiring such protection in the future. This is precisely what Trebro did when it entered the sod harvester market without any protection from the
competing technology embodied in the ‘638 patent.46 Second, we
say a firm is a diagonally integrated non-practicing entity
(NPE) with respect to a technology b if it owns but does not
practice the patent on b, but competes with products using
technology b in a downstream product market47 (detailed anal46. See Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 1159, 1162,
1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
47. The term “diagonal integration” refers to a situation in which a producer acquires control of an upstream input used by a rival firm, but which
the producer does not utilize in its own product. Thus a diagonally integrated
NPE is simply a firm who becomes diagonally integrated by acquiring a patent
that is practiced (or could be practiced) by some rival producers, but not by the
acquiring firm itself. Note that acquiring but not practicing a patent may be
valuable even if rivals do not presently practice the patent, as this may serve
as a barrier to entry. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.3 (discussing
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ysis of diagonally integrated NPEs and their welfare effects is
the subject of Part III). Trebro became a diagonally integrated
NPE when it acquired the ‘638 patent despite not using that
technology in its own sod harvester.48
Our primary conclusion is that a diagonally integrated
NPE should never be entitled to enjoin an infringer of the diagonally integrated NPE’s unpracticed patent, if the diagonally
integrated NPE entered the market before acquiring that patent from an unrelated third party. This implies that Trebro
should be denied an injunction, as it entered the sod harvester
market long before it acquired its unpracticed ‘638 patent.49
However, the Federal Circuit reached a different conclusion,
determining that such an injunction might be warranted in order to protect Trebro’s interest in its own competing (but uninfringed) product.50 We show that this view is mistaken. Rather,
injunctions in such circumstances are never warranted, because the plaintiff’s unprotected market entry indicates that
she was undeterred by the possibility of competing with thennoninfringing competitors like the defendant. Thus, an inabilintellectual property acquisitions by dominant firms as a potentially exclusionary practice in violation of sections 2 or 7 of the Clayton Act). Indeed, one
further implication of our analysis (extending beyond our specific focus on patent injunctions) may be that the enforcement agencies and the courts should
be more receptive to arguments that certain patent acquisitions “may . . . substantially lessen competition” in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). For recent discussions of the possible violation
of section 7 by PAEs, see Ilene Knable Gotts & Scott Sher, The Particular Antitrust Concerns with Patent Acquisitions, COMP. L. INT’L, Aug. 2012, at 19;
John “Jay” Jurata, Jr. & Amisha R. Patel, Taming the Trolls: Why Antitrust Is
Not a Viable Solution for Stopping Patent Assertion Entities, 21 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1251, 1259–65 (2014); Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activities—“Follow the Money,” 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423,
438–40 (2014); Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on
Patent Assertion Entities, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445, 453–55 (2014); Mark S.
Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2013, at 11–12,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/
apr13_full_source.authcheckdam.pdf; J. Robert Robertson & Logan M. Breed,
United States v. Widget Co., Newco, and Patent Aggregator Plus LLC: A Hypothetical Closing Argument, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 531–34 (2014).
48. See Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1162, 1164, 1171.
49. Trebro’s website indicates that it entered the sod harvester market in
1999. TREBRO INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS: COMPANY, http://www.trebro.com/
company (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). However, it did not acquire the ‘638 patent until 2013. Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1162.
50. Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1171.
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ity to exclude these competitors would not have deterred such a
firm from bringing its own technology to market. Finally, it is
important to note that, by restricting attention to diagonally integrated NPEs, our conclusion does not apply to situations in
which the plaintiff began practicing the disputed patent after
acquiring it—even though she initially entered the market unprotected from that technology. In such a case an injunction
might be necessary to protect the incentive to implement the
newly acquired technology.
To verify this result, suppose that there is a second, distinct technology b that serves as an alternative to technology a.
That is, a and b are substitute, mutually non-infringing technologies used as an input in the downstream product. There is
a downstream firm that is considering developing its idea for
technology a, but that now also considers the possibility of diagonally integrating by acquiring the patent on b, which was
invented by someone else. Like the patent on a, the added value of acquiring the patent on b depends on whether it will be
protected by a property rule or a liability rule. If the firm
brings a to market, the incremental value of being diagonally
integrated with respect to b is given by VP(b) if the courts apply
a property rule and VL(b) if they apply a liability rule. This incremental value consists not only in the value of potentially licensing the patent on b, but also in the increased profitability
of the firm’s own downstream product. These profits increase
because the patent on b allows the firm to suppress competition
from competing firms who use b by raising their licensing costs
or by restricting their access to b. Importantly, the potential to
suppress competition in this way is much stronger if the courts
apply a property rule, as the possibility of injunctive relief provides the ultimate leverage over rivals who utilize b. Finally,
the price of the patent on b is given by P(b), where VP(b) > VL(b)
> P(b).51 In what follows we assume that the courts apply a
property rule to the inventor’s practiced patent on a, and instead focus on the rule applied to its unpracticed patent on b.
In principle, it is possible that the firm’s interest in b would
have to be protected by a property rule in order to motivate it to
bring a to market in the first place. This possibility is described
by condition (C3).
51. Here we assume that the patent on technology b is worth buying even
if the inventor’s interest therein is protected by a liability rule, but this need
not be the case. However, this alternative need not be separately addressed, as
our primary conclusion obtains either way.
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(C3) ΠP(a) – C(a) + VP(b) – P(b) ≥ R > ΠP(a) – C(a) + VL(b) –
P(b)
This says that the firm will develop its own idea for a only
if (1) it can also become a diagonally integrated NPE with respect to b; and (2) its interest in b will be protected by a property rule. In these cases we would expect that the firm would assure itself of some protection against b before committing to
enter the market with technology a. By contrast, it may be that
the firm would bring a to market even if its interest in b would
be protected only by a liability rule. This is stated in condition
(C4).
(C4) ΠP(a) – C(a) + VP(b) – P(b) > ΠP(a) – C(a) + VL(b) – P(b) ≥
R
If (C4) holds, then the court should not enjoin a product
that infringes the plaintiff’s unpracticed patent on b, because
this is unnecessary to protect her incentive to develop a. Of
course, as before, it often may be impossible to determine
whether a plaintiff’s situation is described by (C3) or by (C4).
However, if the plaintiff previously engaged in unprotected
market entry with respect to the disputed technology, then this
is not so. In this case, the firm’s willingness to bring a to market did not depend on having any protection against competing
products using technology b. That is, the firm did not rely on its
ability to diagonally integrate with respect to b when it chose to
develop technology a. This is embodied in condition (C5).
(C5) ΠP(a) – C(a) ≥ R
This says that technology a is sufficiently profitable on its
own to motivate its development, even in lieu of any protection
against technology b. It follows that the firm’s situation must
be described by (C4). To see this, note that (C5) directly implies
(C4). This establishes that, if a diagonally integrated NPE entered the market unprotected from its unpracticed technology,
then it should never be entitled to enjoin an infringer of that
technology’s patent. Such an injunction would do nothing to
promote dynamic welfare. The intuition for this is simple: the
firm’s decision to bring its own technology to market did not
depend at all on the possibility of diagonal integration, and
hence its entry decision could not have depended on what rule
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might serve to protect such integration. Thus awarding an injunction to such a firm will engender all the static harms of injunctive relief without affording any offsetting dynamic benefits. Consequently the Federal Circuit’s decision in Trebro is
not only unnecessary, it is also likely to be harmful.52
Of course, this result concerns the decision to develop
technology a, not technology b, whose development we have so
far taken as given. Thus the reader may be concerned that our
proposal would dampen the incentive to innovate those technologies that might be sold to firms hoping to diagonally integrate and enjoin rivals. Indeed, it is true that a rule barring injunctions against infringers of a diagonally integrated NPE’s
unpracticed patent will tend to reduce the amount this NPE
would pay for the patent. However, this is not problematic, because no social benefit derives from the sale of a patent to a diagonally integrated NPE who, like Trebro, hopes to exclude
those rivals that might use the patented technology. Such a
transaction does not lead to any expanded use of the patented
technology. Thus, developing a technology for this purpose is a
little like building a factory in the hope that a rival manufacturer will acquire it and shut it down. Any spending on research and development motivated purely by this possibility is
best regarded as deadweight loss. Consequently, there should
not be any policy for encouraging these transactions.53
52. Conceivably, there could be cases in which the plaintiff was considering the acquisition of b when it developed a. One could then imagine a subset
of these cases in which the decision to develop a hinged on (1) the probability
that the plaintiff would succeed in acquiring b; and (2) in the event it did so,
its having the option of enforcing the b patent by means of an injunction. Even
then, however, granting an injunction against the unauthorized use of b would
be justified only if the social benefits from the development of a outweighed
the cost of suppressing competition from b. In our view, allowing injunctions to
issue based on (what strikes us as) the remote possibility that these conditions
might be present would be letting the tail wag the dog. Allowing the injunction
to issue based on proof of these conditions might be feasible, but could substantially increase adjudication costs.
53. One might argue that, even if the assignee intends to use the patent
only to exclude competitors, the public still gains something in terms of the
disclosure embodied in the nonused patent. Nevertheless, allowing the assignee to enjoin its competitor from using the patent on b would promote social
welfare only if the social value of the disclosure that otherwise would not occur
outweighs the resulting deadweight loss. Although in theory this may be possible, it seems unlikely given that (1) many, perhaps most, inventions are invented or discovered independently by multiple inventors, see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012); (2) even if
only one firm were to invent b during a given period of time, it is reasonable to
assume that in only a subset of such cases would the firm be motivated to ob-
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We close this section with two important points concerning
the foregoing analysis. First, while the facts of Trebro may
seem unusual, our results are in fact widely applicable, particularly in patent-rich industries where patents are frequently
bought and sold. In recent years, firms in the telecommunications sector in particular have made strategic acquisitions of
huge patent portfolios, presumably including large numbers of
patents that the acquirers themselves do not use.54 These patain a patent only on the expectation that its future assignee would be able to
use the patent to suppress competition against unpatented products; and (3)
the social value of what is disclosed in the typical patent is often quite low,
due to, among other things, patent law’s failure to require working examples,
see Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 628–32 (2010).
54. See, e.g., Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 43, at 491–93 (discussing
acquisitions by Apple, Google, and others); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust
Division on Its Decision To Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition
of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by
Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 2012), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its
-decision-close-its-investigations (discussing acquisitions by Google, Apple,
and the Rockstar consortium (consisting of Apple, RIM, Microsoft, Ericsson,
and Sony)); Chris Foresman, Big Bidding: Apple, Microsoft, RIM Nab Nortel
Patents for $4.5 Billion, ARSTECHNICA (July 1, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/
apple/2011/07/apple-ms-rim-nab-nortel-mobile-patents-for-45-billion;
Rhian
Hunt, Samsung Buys Patents To Use Against Apple (AAPL) in Latest Lawsuit,
PFHUB (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.pfhub.com/samsung-buys-patents-to-use
-against-apple-aapl-in-latest-lawsuit-593; Yoree Koh, Twitter Acquires More
than 900 Patents from IBM, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Jan. 31, 2014), http://blogs
.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/31/twitter-acquires-ibm-patents; Robert McMillan,
How Apple and Google Armed 4,000 Patent Warheads, WIRED (May 21, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/2012/05/rockstar; Cade Metz, Microsoft Shuttles AOL
Patent Portfolio to Facebook, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.wired.com/
2012/04/microsoft-aol-facebook; Phil Milford & Susan Decker, Google Hands
HTC Patents To Use Against Apple in Smartphone Wars, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-07/htc-sues-apple
-alleging-infringement-of-four-u-s-patents.html; Craig Silverman, LinkedIn
Acquires Major Fact Checking Patents, POYNTER.ORG (June 20, 2014), http://
www.poynter.org/latest-news/regret-the-error/256315/linkedin-acquires-the
-far-reaching-portfolio-of-fact-checking-patents; Bill Slawski, Twitter’s New
Patent Trove (943 Patents) from IBM, SEO BY THE SEA (Feb. 1, 2014), http://
www.seobythesea.com/2014/02/twitters-new-patent-trove-943-patents-ibm;
Tess Stynes, Qualcomm Acquires Mobile Technology Patents from HewlettPackard, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303448204579339160154556786; Brian Womack, Facebook
Is Said To Buy 750 IBM Patents To Boost Defenses, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar.
22, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-22/facebook-is-said-to-buy
-750-ibm-patents-to-boost-defenses.html; see also Colleen Chien, From Arms
Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for
the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 338, 340 (2010) (stating that a “prac-
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tented technologies may be used by competitors, however, in
which case the acquiring firms become diagonally integrated
NPEs. If, prior to acquiring these patent portfolios, such firms
entered the relevant product markets unprotected from the acquired technologies (as is likely the case in the majority of such
acquisitions) then they are fundamentally no different from
Trebro. Such patent acquisitions have not previously been
viewed in this light, and thus our results provide an improved
understanding of how they should factor into the discussion of
patent remedies. Further, as Part III demonstrates, diagonal
integration is not only widespread, it is also unusually harmful
to competition and consumers; its effects are substantially
worse than those that would arise if the patents were owned by
a standard (unintegrated) NPE. This provides yet another reason for the courts to be particularly cautious when adjudicating
cases filed by diagonally integrated patent holders.
Second, our analysis demonstrates that the post-eBay approach to injunctive relief focuses too narrowly on the marginal
effects of enjoining the defendant and too little on the plaintiff’s
incentives at the time of invention. The prevailing method of
assessing the merits of injunctive relief focuses on the time of
infringement and involves balancing the interests of the parties
and the public at large moving forward.55 And, while this involves a number of important considerations, it ignores the
question of whether the possibility of injunctive relief was actually a necessary quid pro quo for the plaintiff’s invention.
This question may be difficult or impossible to answer in many
situations, but this does not mean the courts should universally
decline to address it. Rather, the plaintiff’s incentives at the
time of invention should be the primary point of focus whenever they can be reliably ascertained.56 It is this consideration
tical consequence of the patent arms race,” characterized by a high volume of
low-cost, low-quality patents, “is that it has left operating companies with
large numbers of unused patents”). Note that the Rockstar Consortium referred to in some of the materials above wound down in 2014 and assigned its
entire portfolio to RPX, a defensive patent aggregator. See Andrew Chung,
RPX Buys Apple-Backed Rockstar Patents for $900 Million, REUTERS (Dec. 23,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-rpx-rockstar-ip-idUSKBN
0K11AI20141223.
55. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
56. One theoretical exception to our general approach consists in what
might be called “infringement stacking” by multiple defendants. In principle,
it could be that multiple defendants are selling different infringing products
(possibly infringing different components of the plaintiff’s product), and that
these products are jointly—but not individually—sufficient to undermine the
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that truly gets at the heart of the patent system’s interest in
limiting its protections to those inventions that would not otherwise come to market.
The next Part applies the foregoing insights to other topics
in patent law where judges and scholars similarly may give too
little consideration to inventors’ incentives at the development
stage when assessing the appropriateness of injunctive relief.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF UNPROTECTED MARKET ENTRY
IN OTHER SETTINGS
One of the two key implications of our model is that it is
sometimes possible to infer that injunctive relief will reduce social welfare, based upon the fact that the patent owner was
willing to enter the market without an expectation of being able
to enjoin its competitors. In this Part, we examine the implications of our unprotected market entry analysis to the question
of whether courts should grant injunctive relief in cases
brought by patent privateers, owners of FRAND-encumbered
SEPs, or firms engaged in preemptive patenting.

plaintiff’s decision to develop its patented technology. If the plaintiff can
demonstrate such widespread infringement, then the courts should award injunctions to the extent necessary to protect the plaintiff’s decision to develop
its product. Thus, when evaluating injunctive relief in a particular case, if possible an adjudicator should consider not only the harm imposed by the presently disputed infringement, but also those of other infringing products still
being sold.
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A. Patent Privateering57
In current usage, the term patent “privateer” most commonly refers to a patent assertion entity (PAE)58 that acquires
a patent or portfolio of patents from a practicing entity and
then seeks to enforce those patents against alleged infringers.
As part of the contract of assignment, the privateer agrees to
share the proceeds of its enforcement efforts with the patent
assignor.59 Privateering appears to be on the rise in both the

57. The term “patent privateering” was coined by Tom Ewing, who first
drew an analogy between the practice described in the text above and the
practice (long since abolished) under which sovereign states would authorize
merchant vessels to plunder enemy vessels during time of war. See Joff Wild,
Universities and NPEs: A Match Made in Heaven, IAM MAGAZINE: BLOG (Oct.
11, 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=37a09238-0376
-4bda-a2ff-9fd0bc6282ca (citing Ewing’s use of the term as quoted in Joff Wild,
Acacia Turns Privateer as Businesses Decide if You Can’t Beat Them, Join
Them, IAM MAGAZINE: BLOG (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.iam-magazine
.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=2db176e6-77b0-45a0-a999-87910c96394a&q). Ewing
has written more extensively on the topic than anyone else of which we are
aware. See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by
Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering and Modern Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012) [hereinafter Ewing,
Indirect Exploitation]; Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect
Deployment of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109 (2012) [hereinafter Ewing, Practical Considerations]; Tom Ewing, Patent Privateering Reloaded, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.,
July–Aug. 2013, at 49 [hereinafter Ewing, Reloaded]; Tom Ewing, Introducing
the Patent Privateers, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 31 [hereinafter Ewing, Introducing]. Scott Morton & Shapiro use the term “hybrid PAE” to
refer to PAEs that have “contractual relationships with downstream firms,”
which would include some privateers, Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 43,
at 489, while John Golden uses the term “patent privateer” in a sense somewhat different from that presented above in his paper, John Golden, Patent
Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
545, 552 n.40 (2013). For other discussions, see, for example, Maurits Dolman,
Privateers and Trolls Join the Global Patent Wars; Can Competition Authorities Disarm Them?, 37 COMPUTERRECHT 80 (2014); Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters Against Apple, Google, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-11/patent
-privateers-sail-the-legal-waters-against-apple-google; Florian Mueller, Nokia
and Ericsson Seek To Justify Their Privateering Ways, Defend Patent Transfers to NPEs, FOSS PATENTS (May 21, 2015), http://www.fosspatents.com/
2015/05/nokia-and-ericsson-seek-to-justify.html.
58. See Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 34 (stating that “[a] privateer need not necessarily be an NPE,” but that “an operating company that
acted as privateer would put itself at risk of a countersuit by the target”).
59. See id. Ewing also discusses other forms of privateering, which he
broadly defines as occurring whenever “operating companies . . . authorise
third parties to chase their competitors using IP rights,” id. at 31, but the form
discussed in the text above is most relevant to our discussion.
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United States60 and may exist in some other countries as well.61
Like other PAEs and unlike many practicing entities, privateers are largely immune from countersuit for patent infringement, since they do not make, use, or sell any products themselves. As a result, some commentators have expressed concern
over the unforeseeable consequences of the massive increase in
patent enforcement to which privateering could give rise,62
while others have suggested that, at least in some instances,
privateering could give rise to antitrust or other liability.63 Privateering’s defenders, on the other hand, characterize the practice as nothing more than an efficient division of labor, akin to
outsourcing.64
We don’t intend to resolve this debate here, but we do
think that a straightforward application of our analysis suggests that courts should not grant injunctive relief in cases in
which a privateer has acquired a patent from a firm that was
not using the patent, and seeks to enforce that patent against
an alleged infringer who sells products that compete against
the assignor’s unpatented products.65 To be sure, privateers are

60. See Ewing, Reloaded, supra note 57 (“[W]e . . . know that privateering
is on the rise”). Ewing presents some preliminary empirical analysis of the incidence of privateering in the United States in Ewing, Indirect Exploitation,
supra note 57, at 40–43.
61. See Köllner & Weber, supra note 21, at 110–11 (discussing IPCom’s
activities in Germany).
62. See Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, supra note 57, at 89; see also Catherine Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on
Entrepreneurial Activity 1 (MIT Sloan School Mgmt., Working Paper No. 509514, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457611 (reporting an inverted U-shape
relation between levels of patent litigation and venture capital investment). In
the copyright sphere, Shyamkrishna Balganesh has argued that much of copyright law evolved on the implicit understanding that rights would be underenforced. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright
Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 729 (2013).
63. See Ewing, Practical Considerations, supra note 57, at 122–26, 138–
50; Popofsky & Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Patent Assertion Entities, supra
note 47, at 455–58; Popofsky & Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust, supra note 47, at 10–12.
64. See Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 37–38.
65. We cannot be so confident in cases in which, prior to the assignment,
the assignor was practicing the patent. Although it may seem less likely that
an assignment would be made at all under these circumstances, it’s certainly
not impossible. If the patent reads on a small component of a complex device,
for example, the patent owner may be better off licensing the patent to competitors and benefiting from its widespread adoption than trying to exclude
those competitors. Alternatively, the owner may want to avoid provoking a retaliatory patent infringement lawsuit. (If the assignee is a PAE and therefore
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among the class of patent owners who generally are not interested in ultimately obtaining injunctions, since (as PAEs) they
sell no products themselves and therefore do not benefit from
actually excluding competitors. But they could use the threat of
injunctive relief to negotiate licensing rates, or to settle pending litigation on terms that are likely to be higher than would
be the case if injunctions were off the table—the reason being
that an infringer who actually is enjoined must figure out some
way to design around the patented technology, and thus would
be willing to pay a licensing fee that reflects not only the value
of that technology in comparison with alternatives but also the
avoided design-around costs.66 These higher royalties, however,
would appear to be unnecessary to induce the assignor’s entry
into the relevant product market, where (on our assumed facts)
the assignor was already selling (unpatented) products in that
market, and not enforcing the patent subsequently assigned to
the privateer, prior to that assignment.67 (Indeed, in some inmakes no products, the defendant can’t file a counterclaim for infringement,
though of course the defendant could retaliate against the assignor if it were
to discover the assignor’s identity.) Or it may prefer to rely upon the privateer’s expertise in litigating and negotiating a royalty even if this means giving up the right to exclude. For a more comprehensive discussion of the many
possible reasons why operating companies and others may find privateering
attractive, see Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, supra note 57, at 55–73; Ewing,
Introducing, supra note 57, at 32–34.
66. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
67. Admittedly, this inference would be incorrect if the assignor entered
the market for a conditional on its ability to assign the patent on b to a privateer and to benefit from the privateer’s ability to extract a supracompensatory
royalty in the shadow of an injunction. This chain of events nevertheless
strikes us as attenuated, particularly if a substantial amount of time has
passed in between the assignor’s entry into a and its assignment of b, though
perhaps one could permit the privateer who requests injunctive relief to present evidence of such facts. Similarly, one might imagine a case in which a
firm developed both a and b before it was clear which technology (say a) was
likely to better suit its needs. We argue below that if the firm retains its patent on b there should be no hard-and-fast rule against granting injunctive relief for the infringement of b, because the development of b may have hinged
on the firm’s expectation that it would be able to enjoin such uses. See infra
Part II.C. If this is correct, though, why should the rule be any different if the
patent owner sells the b patent to a privateer, rather than retaining it? The
answer is that the assignment to the privateer assumes that the privateer ultimately will license the patent; the privateer will be able to derive more licensing revenue if it can credibly threaten an injunction, but as a nonpracticing entity the privateer has no ultimate interest in excluding users from the
market. Enjoining the unauthorized use of b in order to preserve the incentive
to develop b therefore makes sense only if there is evidence that that incentive
depended on the prospect of deriving a supracompensatory licensing fee based
on a privateer’s subsequent ability to threaten injunctive relief. Whether the
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stances, the firm that assigns the patent to the privateer may
have acquired that patent after entering the market, in which
case the fact pattern is, for all intents and purposes, identical
to that of Trebro.)68 The assignor’s pre-assignment behavior
therefore provides us with evidence from which it is reasonable
to infer that condition (C5) is satisfied, and therefore that the
privateer should not be able to enjoin the infringement of b.69
benefit of permitting such (possibly self-serving) evidence in either case outweighs the likely cost is a judgment call.
The argument in the text above might also seem to suggest that courts
should deny injunctive relief even if the assignor didn’t assign the patent to a
privateer, but rather decided to enforce the patent itself after having tolerated
its infringement for a period of time. Such a rule, however, would require
courts to determine after what period of time it is reasonable to infer that (C5)
is satisfied, a fact that might be extremely difficult to ascertain. What the privateering example adds to the mix is that the assignor clearly contemplates
third-party use of the patented technology, which (coupled with the assignor’s
unprotected entry) makes it reasonable to infer that injunctive relief is unnecessary to induce the assignor’s entry in the market for a. Conceivably, though,
the equitable doctrines of laches or estoppel might preclude a suit for injunctive relief or damages in a case in which the patent owner unreasonably delays
enforcing its patent. See, e.g., Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1962, 1974 n.15 (2014); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality
Baby Prods., L.L.C., 767 F.3d 1339, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rehearing en
banc granted, 2014 WL 7460970 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2014).
68. See Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 33 (positing an example in
which “an incumbent’s market position is being etched away by an upstart
competitor employing a replacement technology,” but neither firm “holds IP
rights that it could effectively use against the other”; in such a case, to employ
a patent against the upstart, the incumbent would have to obtain the patent
from a third party, but may prefer to outsource its enforcement for various
reasons).
69. As in our example derived from the facts of Trebro in Part I, one might
ask whether denying the privateer the ability to threaten an injunction might
reduce the incentive to invent b. Perhaps firms would invest more in developing or acquiring patents if they expected to be able to sell some of those patents to privateers in exchange for some portion of the royalties the privateer
is able to extract. According to Ewing, however, some transfers to privateers
are motivated less by the assignor’s expectation of a share of the royalties than
by the desire to impede competition. See Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, supra
note 57, at 32–36, 55–58; Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 32–36. Moreover, some empirical evidence suggests that (in general) only a small percentage of PAE licensing revenue make its way back to inventors. See James E.
Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 388, 410–11 (2014) (asserting that, at most, 20% of defendants’
payments to NPEs go to patentees); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 461 (2012) (“[T]he evidence does not support a theory
that NPEs incentivize investment by providing a market for patents,” although they do “provide a better way for individual inventors to enforce their
patents than bringing lawsuits themselves.”); cf. David L. Schwartz & Jay P.
Kesan, Essay, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent Sys-
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And if it cannot actually obtain an injunction, it cannot credibly
threaten to do so either.
Concededly, U.S. courts post-eBay are likely to deny privateers and other PAEs injunctions anyway.70 Nevertheless, our
analysis provides some additional reasons not to do so, and
might be particularly helpful in non-U.S. jurisdictions that are
still determining when, if ever, to award prevailing patent
owners prospective damages in lieu of injunctive relief.71 Alternatively, as discussed below,72 if we are right in concluding that
injunctive relief would always or almost always reduce social
welfare in an identifiable class of cases, perhaps it would be
appropriate for competition law to develop a response, at least
as a second-best solution in jurisdictions that adhere to a preeBay view of the prevailing patentee’s right to obtain a permanent injunction.
B. FRAND-ENCUMBERED SEPS
A rationale similar to that sketched out above also might
apply to cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs. As noted
earlier, SSOs often require their members to disclose any relevant patents before the standard under consideration is adopted, to declare any patents that are essential to the standard
once the standard is chosen, and to commit to licensing those
patents on FRAND terms (or else to exit the SSO).73 Initially,
one might wonder why an SEP owner that makes products

tem, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 426, 443–44 (2014) (faulting Bessen & Meurer’s estimate above, on the ground that it is based largely on three large firms—
InterDigital, Tessera, and Rambus—that conduct much of their own R&D inhouse); Bessen & Meurer, supra, at 419 (responding to Schwartz & Kesan).
Conceivably, though, if a court were concerned about this possibility, it could
allow the privateer to elicit contrary evidence in support of an injunction, subject to the caveats noted supra note 67.
Finally, note that the incentive we are discussing here is premised on the
privateer’s ability to extract what we have termed a supracompensatory royalty, based in part on the infringer’s avoided switching costs. See supra text accompanying notes 41–42. In the following section, we argue that the patent
incentive does not depend upon the ability to extract these costs. See infra
notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71. At present, most of the world’s major patent litigation systems award
injunctive relief to the prevailing patent owner more or less automatically, and
do not follow eBay. For discussion, see COTTER, supra note 29, at 176–84, 245–
48, 305–07.
72. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 27.
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(say, a smartphone manufacturer) and that competes with other firms that make rival products and therefore might benefit
from a FRAND license covering the SEP would ever commit to
such licensing.74 Wouldn’t the owner be better off using its patent to exclude rather than license competitors? The answer is,
not necessarily.
One reason firms join SSOs and thus commit to FRAND licensing is that membership in an SSO guarantees that the firm
will be able to participate in the standard-setting process (and
thus, perhaps, influence that process in a manner that benefits
them). Moreover, it is in the collective interest of the SSO
membership to ensure that each member will have access to all
of the members’ patents that are needed to practice the standard. Smartphone Company A therefore may find it beneficial to
commit to FRAND license its SEPs to Smartphone Company B,
in return for the latter’s commitment to do likewise.75 In short,
firms participate in SSOs because they conclude it is in their
interest to do so, even though they may be giving something up
in the process.
In several recent cases in both the United States and
abroad, the question has arisen whether a firm that makes a
FRAND commitment generally gives up the right to injunctive
relief, or whether it is still appropriate to request an injunction
if the firm and the alleged infringer are unable to agree on
what a FRAND royalty would be.76 At first blush, our analysis
would appear to support the view that courts generally should
deny injunctions to owners of FRAND-encumbered SEPs, be-

74. Relatedly, one also might wonder why SEP owners who sell the components used in products such as smartphones so frequently commit to
FRAND, instead of keeping open the option of exclusive licensing (an option
that firms in other industries sometimes find to their advantage). For discussion of the various patented technologies that can be found in the typical
smartphone, and who owns those technologies, see Ann Armstrong et al., The
Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components
Within Modern Smartphones (2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploaded
Files/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-Smartphone
-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf.
75. Since many SSOs require FRAND licensing even to nonmembers, one
might imagine there would be cases in which a firm would be better off exiting
an SSO, or never joining it in the first place, and enjoying the benefits of
members’ FRAND commitments without having to reciprocate. For a theoretical discussion of firms’ incentives to join or exit SSOs, see Anne Layne-Farrar
et al., Payments and Participation: The Incentives To Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 24 (2014).
76. See infra notes 79–82, 96–99 and accompanying text.
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cause the owner’s decision to commit to FRAND licensing (instead of exiting) indicates that it viewed the benefits of widespread licensing on FRAND terms as outweighing the benefits
of excluding downstream users. In other words, to the extent a
firm joins or remains in an SSO and therefore commits to
FRAND licensing, it cannot seriously argue that its incentive to
innovate depended on its ability to exclude, since it knew going
in that it would have to license its SEPs. Thus, as in the cases
we discussed in Parts I and II.A, the patentee in this example
arguably has revealed that its incentive to innovate did not depend upon its ability to exclude downstream users. If this is
correct, an injunction would appear to generate social harm in
the form of deadweight loss, with no corresponding social benefit.
This analysis nevertheless falls short of proving that SEP
owners should rarely or never be allowed to obtain injunctions.
SSOs themselves generally do not define what a FRAND commitment means, and before the standard is adopted firms
themselves rarely disclose the terms on which they intend to
license their patents.77 The principal reason that SSOs do not
require more detail up front is one of cost: given the large numbers of SEPs that may read on a given standard, the inherent
difficulty in valuing new technology, and the time it would take
to work out the relevant terms and conditions pre-adoption, the
most efficient procedure may be simply to require firms to
commit to FRAND and work out the details later.78 As a consequence, however, there may be disputes over whether the terms
77. There are some exceptions. A few SSOs require royalty-free licensing,
see Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 244 n.81 (2014),
while others require members to announce their maximum terms in advance,
see Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results
and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 173–75 (2013).
Most SSOs do not impose these requirements, however.
78. See Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47
HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1027–29 (2010) (stating that among the reasons firms
“might prefer the ambiguous RAND commitment over a more conventional,
explicit pricing term” are that “intricate negotiations over patent validity and
patent value would take an enormous amount of time”; that “standard-setting
is a process run by engineers, not lawyers”; that “many new technologies flop”;
and that “RAND allows implementing firms to wait for additional information
before they commit to a specific royalty structure”). Potentially, there could
also be antitrust problems if the SSO itself set license terms. For discussion,
see Thomas F. Cotter, Reflections on the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s Report and Recommendations Relating to the Antitrust/IP Interface, 53
ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 786–94 (2008); Lichtman, supra, at 1046 n.65.
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a particular SEP owner is demanding (or that a prospective user is willing to accept) fall within the FRAND range. In such
cases, SEP owners would like to reserve the right to obtain injunctive relief, since this option provides them with greater leverage in negotiating a rate. Users, on the other hand, prefer
that if the parties cannot agree, the SEP owner sues for infringement, and the patent is found to be valid and infringed,
the court itself will determine the FRAND royalty and award
the owner damages based on that royalty for the user’s past
and future use of the SEP. To date, a handful of federal courts
have sided with the users’ position on this issue,79 as have the
federal antitrust agencies and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.80 The United States International Trade
Commission, on the other hand, so far has taken the opposite
view,81 as have some courts in other countries.82
79. The Federal Circuit recently affirmed Judge Posner’s decision that
Motorola would not be entitled to an injunction for Apple’s alleged infringement of a Motorola SEP, albeit without creating a per se rule against such injunctions. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL
5993202, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012) (concluding that Motorola would
not have been entitled to a permanent injunction against Microsoft’s alleged
infringement of Motorola’s FRAND-encumbered SEPs). In at least two other
cases, SEP owners chose not to request injunctive relief and the trier of fact
determined the amount of damages. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, L.L.C.
Patent Litig., MDL Docket No. 2303, Case No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Case No. 6:10-CV-473,
2013 WL 4046225 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
80. See Matter of Motorola Mobility L.L.C. and Google Inc., Docket No. C4410, File No. 121-0120, 2013 WL 3944149 (F.T.C. July 24, 2013); U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON
REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY
F/RAND COMMITMENTS (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/atr/legacy/2014/09/18/290994.pdf.
81. See Certain Elec. Commc’n Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, at 41–64, 107–14
(July 5, 2013) (Commission Opinion). U.S. Trade Representative Michael
Froman subsequently exercised his authority to disapprove the exclusion order, however. See Letter from Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman to Honorable
Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013)
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.pdf. Nevertheless, in
another more recent ITC investigation, Administrative Law Judge Essex concluded that InterDigital did not breach its FRAND obligation by seeking an
exclusion order against several alleged infringers. See Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA868 (June 26, 2014) (Initial Determination).
82. For discussion through 2013, see Cotter, supra note 32. As noted below, however, there are some foreign cases denying SEP owners injunctions on
the basis of antitrust or other bodies of law. See infra notes 96–99 and accom-
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We think the following observations are relevant to the
correct resolution of these issues. First, as already noted, in
cases in which the SEP owner made a FRAND commitment, it
is reasonable to assume that the owner’s incentive to invent did
not depend on the expectation of ultimately enforcing injunctions against end users, since the owner voluntarily chose to
remain in the SSO and to commit to FRAND licensing. An appropriate royalty therefore should suffice to preserve this incentive.83 Second, however, like the privateers we discussed in
the preceding section, SEP owners nevertheless may value being able to threaten an injunction in the event accused infringers are unwilling to meet their demands. Third, SEP owners
are different from privateers in some ways that might make it
more challenging to predict the impact of injunctive relief on
inventor behavior. In the privateering example, we could state
with confidence that the privateer’s interest in threatening an
injunction to obtain supracompensatory royalties for b did not
motivate the assignor to enter the market for a, because (on our
assumed facts) prior to the assignment the assignor was not using the b patent to shield a from competition.84 We also suggested that the privateer’s conduct may have little bearing on
the incentive to invent b, particularly if (as may often be the
case) inventors reap only a small share of the privateer’s booty.85 In the present context, however, the analysis centers on
just one patent, a, and perhaps the patent owner credibly could
argue that the additional leverage a threatened injunction provides increases its own incentive to invest in the inventions like
a, by increasing the expected royalties to be derived from others’ use of a.86
panying text.
83. Note that, while we stated above that our analysis would be limited to
cases involving inadvertent infringement, it may be appropriate to dispense
with this requirement in the present context, at least in cases in which the alleged infringer is willing to negotiate a license but the parties cannot reach
agreement on its terms. Detailed discussion of this matter is beyond the scope
of this Article, but the question of whether courts should require evidence that
a defendant is a “willing licensee”—and if so, precisely what this means—
before dispensing with injunctive relief is, at present, very much a live issue in
both the United States and Europe.
84. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 69.
86. See Bernhard Ganglmair et al., Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a
Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. ECON. 249, 261–
62 (2012) (arguing that limiting the patentee to FRAND damages may negatively affect the incentive to innovate). There is also the possibility that if the
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We can’t rule out this possibility, but we remain skeptical
for two reasons. First, given that the SEP owner’s willingness
to innovate depends, ultimately, on receiving adequate monetary compensation and not on exclusion, an appropriate royalty
should be sufficient to induce a’s invention. In this regard, federal law authorizes courts to award not only compensatory
damages,87 but also prejudgment interest88 (which may be compounded)89 plus (in an appropriate case) attorneys’ fees90 and
enhanced damages for willful infringement.91 Thus, while SEP
owners may foresee even higher royalties if they can bargain in
the shadow of an injunction, courts appear to have adequate
tools to award them the FRAND royalty they could have expected ex ante. Absent some reason to believe that courts systematically are likely to err in favor of defendants,92 there is no
consequences of joining an SSO are more onerous than the consequences of
remaining outside, some firms will have an incentive to remain outside, thus
reducing some of the social benefits of having SSOs in the first place. See
Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 75, at 25. Although the issue is beyond the
scope of this Article, this possibility might lead one to conclude that courts
should apply the same damages and injunction rules to SEPs regardless of
whether the SEP is FRAND-encumbered.
87. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court.”).
88. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983); see
also PATENT DAMAGES HANDBOOK COMM., COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ISSUES
IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES: A HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES 3 (2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_PatentDamages_Ed
.pdf (“[T]he court may award pre-judgment interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284 on
the compensatory portion of the damages award, pre-judgment interest on any
award of attorney fees, and post-judgment interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 on
the entire award.”).
89. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (stating that, while “‘an award of compound rather than simple interest assures that the patent owner is fully compensated.’ . . . the determination whether to award simple or compound interest is a matter largely within
the discretion of the district court” (citations omitted)).
90. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (stating that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”); Octane Fitness,
L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (“[C]ourts
may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of
their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”).
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed.”); Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters
Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that enhanced damages
are available only for “willful” infringement).
92. Compare Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking
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obvious reason to conclude that a damages remedy would confound the patentee’s investment-backed expectations.93
Our second ground for skepticism arises from the fact that
the leverage a threatened injunction provides is due to the implementer’s having incurred sunk costs in implementing the
patented technology and to the costs of switching to a noninfringing technology.94 Ex post, the infringer would be willing to
pay a royalty that would reflect these costs. As one of us argues
in a companion piece, however, there is no obvious reason to
conclude that innovation incentives depend on the SEP owner’s
ability to extract these costs, which bear no relationship to the
value of the patented technology over alternatives.95 If this reasoning is correct, it may provide an adequate ground for denying SEP owners injunctive relief independent of our unprotected market entry analysis. Nevertheless, we think the latter
provides an additional reason for doubting the efficiency of injunctions in SEP cases, and therefore strengthens the antiinjunction position.
As noted above, courts outside the United States by and
large have not embraced the eBay standard, and continue to
award prevailing patent owners injunctions as a matter of
Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535,
557–58 (2008) (arguing that damages are likely to be undercompensatory due
to factors such as hindsight bias, difficulties that patent owners may face in
communicating value to juries, damages estimation techniques that
shortchange accuracy for administrative ease, and selection bias), with Cotter,
supra note 32, at 345 (critiquing Elhauge).
93. One occasionally hears the argument that, if the court simply awards
the FRAND royalty, there is no incentive on the part of alleged infringers to
negotiate. On this view, patentees bear all the risk of litigation (including a
finding of noninfringement or invalidity) and therefore may be willing to settle
for an undercompensatory royalty. This argument ignores the potential downside facing the defendant, however, including not only its own attorneys’ fees
but the other consequences noted in the text above. It also arguably downplays
the significance of the fact that (as a general matter) in patent cases litigated
to judgment, patent owners win only about 30% of the time. See John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1769, 1787–88 (2014). Approximately 40% of all litigated patents are invalidated, see id. at 1787, and by some estimates over 50% of all patents declared essential aren’t, see FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS
DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL TO LTE AND SAE (4G WIRELESS STANDARDS)
THROUGH JUNE 30, 2009 2 (2010), http://www.frlicense.com/LTE%20Final%
20Report.pdf; FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS DECLARED AS
ESSENTIAL TO WCDMA THROUGH DECEMBER, 2008 2 (2009), http://www
.frlicense.com/wcdma1.pdf.
94. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
95. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 33.
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course. Courts in some countries nevertheless sometimes have
found exceptions to this rule in other bodies of law. The European Commission, for example, recently concluded that owners
of FRAND-encumbered SEPs may be liable under European
competition law’s “abuse of dominant position” doctrine, if they
persist in seeking injunctive relief against willing licensees.96
(The Court of Justice of the European Union will be addressing
this issue in a different case sometime in the near future.)97
Similarly, courts in Japan98 and the Netherlands99 have held
that SEP owners may be barred from obtaining injunctions under the civil law doctrine of “abuse of right” if they refuse to
honor their FRAND commitments. Without expressing a view
on the merits of these cases—or the comparative advantages or

96. See European Commission Press Release IP/14/490, Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally Binding Commitments by Samsung Electronics on
Standard Essential Patent Injunctions (Apr. 29, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-490_en.htm; European Commission Press Release
IP/14/489, Antitrust: Commission Finds that Motorola Mobility Infringed EU
Competition Rules by Misusing Standard Essential Patents (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-489_en.htm; European Commission
Memorandum, Antitrust Decisions on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs)—
Motorola Mobility and Samsung Electronics—Frequently Asked Questions
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-322_en.htm.
97. More specifically, a German court referred to the Court of Justice of
the European Union a series of questions relating to whether it is an abuse of
dominant position for the owner of a FRAND-encumbered SEP to seek and enforce an injunction when the infringer has expressed its willingness to negotiate a FRAND license. See Request for a Preliminary Ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Germany), Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v.
ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, (Apr. 5, 2013), http://curia.europa
.eu/juris (type “C-170/13” into “Case Number” field; then follow “list of documents” hyperlink; then view document titled “Application (OJ)”).
98. See Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May
16, 2014, no. 10043, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB], http://
www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/25ne10043full.pdf; Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 16, 2014, no. 10007, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB], http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/
25_ra_10007zenbun.pdf; Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop.
High Ct.] May 16, 2014, no. 10008, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO
WEB], http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/25_ra_10008zenbun.pdf.
99. See Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 14 mars 2012, HA ZA 11-2212, HA ZA
11-2213, HA ZA 11-2215 (Samsung Elecs. Co./Apple Inc.), http://uitspraken
.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV8871. For discussion in English, see Michael Fröhlich & Gertjan Kuipers, FRAND and Injunctive Relief, AIPPI E-NEWS, NO. 25 (July 2012), https://www.aippi.org/
enews/2012/edition25/Michael_Frohlich.html; Florian Mueller, Samsung Suffers Second and Even More Important FRAND Defeat to Apple in the Netherlands, FOSS PATENTS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/03/
samsung-suffers-second-and-even-more.html.
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disadvantages of these other bodies of law to resolve them—we
note only that, as a matter of policy, they may be correct in
denying injunctions in a setting in which the anticompetitive
effect of that remedy likely outweighs any benefit to dynamic
efficiency. Perhaps our analysis could play a role as these countries continue to grapple with cases involving PAEs and SEPs.
C. PREEMPTIVE PATENTING
In Part I, we showed that when (as in Trebro) a firm that
sells products covered by technology a acquires from a third
party a patent on technology b, courts should not enjoin inadvertent infringers from using the b patent, but instead should
award only a reasonable royalty. On these facts, injunctive relief causes an unambiguous social welfare loss.100 A natural extension of our analysis would be to consider whether courts
should award injunctions when the firm selling products covered by technology a itself invents and patents technology b. Initially, one might think that, if our preceding analysis is correct, it shouldn’t matter whether the firm acquired b from a
third party or developed it in-house; the welfare consequences
of injunctive relief should be the same. As discussed below,
however, although we suspect that this may be right, we cannot
be quite as confident as in our preceding examples that injunctions necessarily disserve the public interest.
The fact pattern we are discussing in this section bears
some resemblance to a phenomenon, known as “preemptive patenting,” that is said to occur when a firm obtains a patent that
it does not intend to use itself or license, because the invention
would compete with some other product the firm already produces and the firm expects that, on net, its aggregate profits
would go down if it produced both products.101 Theoretical

100. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
101. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 248–50; Blair & Cotter, supra
note 28. Preemptive patenting is distinct from so-called predatory innovation,
which is said to occur when social or consumer welfare decreases as a result of
a firm’s acquisition or extension of monopoly power through the introduction
of new products against which its rivals cannot effectively compete. In theory,
predatory innovation could be viewed as an attempt to monopolize, in violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Because innovation typically enhances longrun social welfare, however, even when it results in a firm’s temporary acquisition of monopoly power, in practice courts have been quite reluctant to embrace predatory innovation theories as a basis for antitrust liability. For an
overview of the economic literature and case law, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CAS-
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analysis of the phenomenon typically begins with a model in
which two firms, an incumbent and an upstart, are engaged in
a race to patent a new technology.102 If the incumbent wins the
race, it may suppress the new technology if the expected profits
from sales of products incorporating that technology are lower
than the expected profits it will lose from sales of products incorporating the old technology. When preemptive patenting occurs, consumers lose out in the short run, because the patent
shields the old product from competition without increasing
output; the effect is the same as in Trebro. Moreover, while the
patent incentive may have spurred the incumbent to invent
and disclose the new technology, if the firm that lost the race
would have succeeded in independently inventing the new
technology the only long-run benefit of awarding the patent to
the incumbent is the marginal benefit of its earlier disclosure,
which could be negligible. Nevertheless, the leading economic
models suggest that preemptive patenting is a rational business strategy only if (1) before the race begins, the incumbent’s
product has few if any commercial substitutes; (2) the incumbent races with only one (or at most, a small number) of potential competitors; and (3) the expected outcome of the inventive
process is relatively certain.103 Economists by and large have
expressed doubts as to whether the combination of these three
conditions is common enough for preemptive patenting to hap-

ES AND MATERIALS

227–31 (2011).
102. See, e.g., Drew Fudenberg et al., Preemption, Leapfrogging and Competition in Patent Races, 22 EUR. ECON. REV. 3, 5–8 (1983); Richard J. Gilbert,
Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY, PREDATION,
AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205, 212–22 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981); Richard J.
Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of
Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 515–17 (1982); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 741,
741–43 (1983); Stephen W. Salant, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of
Monopoly: Comment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 247, 247–50 (1984); John Vickers,
Pre-Emptive Patenting, Joint Ventures, and the Persistence of Oligopoly, 3
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 261, 262–63 (1985).
103. See Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 102, at 522–25; Richard S. Gilbert
& Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger
Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 578 (1995);
Reinganum, supra note 102, at 745–46; see also Fudenberg et al., supra note
102, at 10–21 (arguing that upstarts can leapfrog over incumbents when the
inventive process is stochastic and occurs in multiple stages, or when firms’
knowledge of their competitors’ R&D is imperfect); Salant, supra note 102
(arguing that preemptive patenting will not occur as long as transaction costs
are sufficiently low for the incumbent and the upstart to negotiate licenses or
assignments).
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pen very often.104
Of course, even if preemptive patenting is uncommon, if
and when it does occur it is likely to reduce social welfare.
Moreover, the fact pattern we are considering in this section—
where a firm that makes and sells products using technology a
invents and patents technology b, but then neither uses nor licenses its b patent—isn’t necessarily limited to cases in which
the firm set out intending to preempt other firms from using b,
and thus arguably incorporates a larger swath of cases than
those involving preemptive patenting as such. In other words,
even if firms rarely set out intending to preempt their rivals by
patenting technology that will thereafter lie idle, one might argue nevertheless that denying the firm an injunction for the infringement of b increases social welfare, because the prospect of
injunctive relief was unnecessary to induce the firm’s entry into
the market for a. The effect is the same, regardless of intent.
The problem with the preceding argument, as we see it, is
that we can’t be as confident as in the Trebro fact pattern that
denial of an injunction will have no impact on the incentive to
invent b.105 When the firm decides to invest in the development
of b, it may have no idea whether b is likely to be commercially
successful or what all of its potential uses may be. Indeed, even
after the patent issues, these matters may remain unclear; the
104. See F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 452 (2d ed. 1980) (concluding that preemptive patenting is less
widespread than is commonly believed); Gilbert, supra note 102, at 211, 239–
57, 269 (describing preemptive patenting as “exceptional”); Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 102, at 514 (same); Reinganum, supra note 102, at 746. Some
authors have argued, however, that the empirical evidence points to several
historical examples of “technology suppression,” which may or may not involve
preemptive patenting. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of
Public Interest, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 391–96 (2002); Kurt M. Saunders
& Linda Levine, Better, Faster, Cheaper—Later: What Happens When Technologies Are Suppressed, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 23, 37–41
(2004); see also Dominique Guellec et al., Pre-Emptive Patenting: Securing
Market Exclusion and Freedom of Operation, 21 ECON. INNOV. & NEW TECH. 1,
20 (2012) (reporting results of an investigation of patent filings in the European Patent Office suggesting that competitors sometimes file low-quality applications to block patenting by others).
105. We noted the potential impact on the incentive to invent and patent b
in the Trebro example, where the firm acquires the patent on b from a third
party. In theory, third parties might be marginally less motivated to invent
and patent b because potential assignees like Trebro will pay less to acquire
the patent on b if they could demand only a reasonable royalty for the use of b.
Even if this somewhat attenuated causal chain obtains in some instances,
however, this reduction in the third party’s incentive to invent and patent b
isn’t necessarily a bad thing. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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patent may sit idle while the firm decides whether to retool its
plant to enable it to use b, or while it searches for an appropriate licensee.106 A no-injunction rule nevertheless effectively
commits the firm, in advance, to license its b patent to competitors on a nonexclusive basis, and on these facts we cannot rule
out the possibility that if faced with this choice the firm will opt
to forgo b.107
To be sure, we don’t know whether these (or other) scenarios play out very often; and even if they do, perhaps the social
cost of enjoining the use of b is large enough that, on balance,
the cost of a few false positives (denying an injunction when it
actually would be welfare-enhancing) outweighs the cost of the
false negatives (granting injunctions when doing so would actually enable preemptive patenting) resulting from a rule that
permits injunctive relief.108 All we can say with certainty, however, is that our unprotected market analysis provides some
reason to question whether injunctions serve the public interest
in cases in which a firm uses patent a and refuses to use or license patent b. It doesn’t prove the case one way or the other,
though, and courts still need to exercise appropriate judgment
based on the facts before them.

106. Recall from above that, in some circumstances, a firm may foresee
higher profits through exclusive licensing. See supra note 36.
107. Of course, if others are likely to independently invent b anyway, the
potential social welfare loss from reducing the patentee’s ex ante incentive to
invent and patent b is somewhat reduced as well. Moreover, not inventing and
patenting b leaves the firm vulnerable to someone else doing so instead, in
which case the firm doesn’t even get the benefit of a reasonable royalty. On
somewhat altered facts, however, if the firm had yet to disclose and market a
when it developed b, it might be less motivated to disclose and market a absent the ability to foreclose competitors from using b, if it believed those competitors would soon develop b on their own. Cf. Michael L. Katz, Intellectual
Property Rights and Antitrust Policy: Four Principles for a Complex World, 1
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 325, 343 n.42 (2002) (“One might also argue
that even purely preemptive patenting is beneficial if it increases the degree to
which the original innovator can earn a return on the innovations of which it
does make use. This line of argument, however, suggests that patent scope
should be increased, not that firms should make real expenditures solely to
protect rents and quasi-rents.”).
108. Conceivably, a court deciding whether to grant an injunction against a
defendant’s use of b could inquire into the facts surrounding the patentee’s decision to invent, or into whether the conditions the economists argue must be
present for preemptive patenting to occur are in fact present. In crafting patent remedies, however, there is always a tradeoff between administrability
and accuracy, and whether it would be worth making such detailed factual inquiries in the sort of case under consideration here strikes us as doubtful.
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III. DIAGONALLY INTEGRATED NON-PRACTICING
ENTITIES
The second key insight that flows from the analysis we
presented in Part I is that diagonally integrated NPEs pose
greater risks to short- and long-term social welfare than do
conventional NPEs. Using a term coined by Richard Higgins,
we consider a firm to be diagonally integrated if it produces a
“downstream” product while also controlling an “upstream” input that is used (or could be used) by downstream rivals, but
which the firm does not use in its own downstream product.109
For example, if an electricity provider acquired a major solar
panel manufacturer but continued to offer only electricity generated by its power station, then it would become diagonally integrated with respect to the solar panel technology. Thus, the
electricity provider does not actually sell the solar panels to
consumers, but the acquisition is nevertheless profitable because it allows the provider to suppress competition with firms
that install residential solar panels by raising their costs of acquiring the solar panels, or potentially by refusing to sell them
solar panels. This is an invaluable opportunity, as a firm will
benefit substantially from an increase in its rival’s costs.110
When diagonal integration involves acquiring the patent to
an input technology used exclusively by downstream rivals,
then the firm becomes a diagonally integrated NPE. By definition it is an NPE with respect to the acquired patent, because
only its rivals practice that patent, but it is also diagonally integrated because it competes with those rivals in the downstream market. At first glance it may seem that diagonal integration is unlikely to be a widespread phenomenon, but in fact
diagonally integrated NPEs are common, particularly in patent-rich technology markets. As noted above, large technology
firms frequently acquire large patent portfolios without intending to practice all of the patents therein.111 These unpracticed
patents nevertheless may improve the acquiring firm’s market
position, as the firm may assert them against competitors
whose products are covered by those patents. In this way, the
patent system creates many opportunities for diagonal integra109. See Higgins, supra note 24, at 610–12 (introducing the concept of “diagonal integration”).
110. Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J.
INDUS. ECON. 19, 20–21 (1987) (explaining why firms benefit by taking
measures that increase rivals’ costs).
111. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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tion. When achieved through patent acquisition, diagonal integration will also tend to be more difficult to circumvent. Indeed,
if an input technology is patent protected, then it will tend to
face less competition, and thus its users may be limited in their
ability to switch to an alternative provider. This enables a diagonally integrated NPE to place more pressure on competitors
whose products read on the acquired patents.
Trebro became a diagonally integrated NPE when it acquired the ‘638 patent but neglected to use that technology in
its own products.112 In this light, the principal impact of Trebro
was to declare that a court may award a plaintiff-manufacturer
injunctive relief for the infringement of a patented technology
with respect to which the firm is diagonally integrated.113 However, as we shall demonstrate, diagonal integration leads to the
worst possible effects on competition and consumers with respect to the unpracticed patent.114 The results are even more
adverse than those that would arise if the unpracticed patent
were held by a standard (unintegrated) NPE. It is therefore
troublesome that the Trebro opinion completely neglected to
explore the competition policy implications of its decision.
Diagonal integration has the flavor of vertical integration,
but in fact it produces very different results.115 A vertically integrated firm is one that sells both an upstream input and a
downstream product that utilizes that input. For example, Apple is vertically integrated with respect to computer hardware
and software, as it produces not only physical computers but
also the OS X operating systems used therein. Microsoft has
historically not been vertically integrated in this way, because
until recently it focused almost exclusively on software, which
it developed and sold to independent PC manufacturers. The
prevailing economic attitude toward vertical integration, often
dubbed the “Post-Chicago” approach, is that it typically produces some procompetitive efficiencies while also creating some potential for anticompetitive conduct.116 The principal procompet112. See Trebro Mfg. v. FireFly Equip., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 1159, 1164 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (“[N]one of Trebro’s currently available sod harvesters practice the
‘638 patent.”).
113. Id. at 1171 (holding that a plaintiff who does not practice a patent
may be entitled to an injunction if it produces a competing product).
114. The appendix develops an economic model that formally proves this
claim.
115. See appendix for a welfare comparison.
116. See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 519–20 (1995).
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itive effects involve the elimination of double marginalization117
and the improved compatibility and design of the integrated articles.118 These efficiencies must be weighed against potential
anticompetitive effects, which include the possibilities of foreclosing rivals or increasing the price they must pay for upstream inputs.119 The prevailing attitude is that, on balance,
most instances of vertical integration are welfare-enhancing.120
The below figures illustrate the differences between possible
downstream-upstream integration arrangements.

In these figures there are two upstream technologies, U1
and U2, which are used in the downstream products D1 and
D2, respectively. The “fenced in” area in each diagram designates the set of upstream and downstream products controlled
by the integrated firm. The right hand diagram, which describes a vertically and diagonally integrated firm, is illustrative of the circumstances in Trebro, and perhaps of most instances in which diagonal integration is achieved through
patent acquisition. This means that the integrated firm is a

117. Double marginalization, also known as royalty stacking or double
markup, refers to a pricing situation in which two or more firms in a supply
chain (including the final product seller) independently apply markups to their
own contributions to the final product. For example, a wholesaler will apply a
positive markup to its sales to a retailer, and the retailer will in turn apply its
own markup to the product when selling it to consumers. All else being constant, double marginalization is always surplus reducing for both firms and
consumers. That is, if a vertically integrated firm applied a single markup to
the final product, the net result would be a lower price and higher total profits,
thus increasing both consumer and producer surplus. See id. at 526–27.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 527–29; see also Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127, 140 (1990).
120. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 116, at 519 (“Because many vertical
mergers create vertical integration efficiencies between purchasers and
sellers, many if not most vertical mergers are either procompetitive or competitively neutral.”).
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practicing entity with respect to its own technologies (meaning
it is vertically integrated with respect to them), and also diagonally integrated with respect to some later-acquired patented
technology.
The appendix develops a simple economic model of diagonal integration that is designed to fit the facts of Trebro. It
measures the impact of a firm like Trebro becoming diagonally
integrated, relative to the case in which the acquired patent is
instead controlled by an unintegrated NPE. It establishes the
general result that diagonal integration generates all the costs
of vertical integration but none of the benefits. It leads the integrated firm to increase its rival’s costs or deny it access to the
upstream input, but it does not produce any cost efficiencies or
improved input-output compatibility. In fact, it actually makes
the double marginalization problem worse by inducing a higher
royalty rate for the upstream input. Thus a diagonally integrated NPE would charge a higher royalty for the unpracticed
patent than would an unintegrated NPE. The intuition for this
is straightforward. A standard NPE has no direct stake in the
downstream market, and thus cares only about the licensing
revenue it receives. By contrast, a diagonally integrated NPE
cares not only about licensing revenue, but also the value of
raising its rival’s costs, which positively impacts its own downstream profits.121 This additional consideration leads the diagonally integrated NPE to set a higher royalty rate than the unintegrated NPE. Patent ownership by a standard NPE is in
turn worse than an arrangement in which the upstream patent
is owned by the producer that utilizes it. In this case that producer is a practicing entity, which is simply a patent holder
that is vertically integrated in the downstream market. This
would achieve the highest possible welfare level with respect to
the patent in question by eliminating the separate upstream
markup.122
121. See Ordover et al., supra note 119, at 127–28; see also Scott Morton &
Shapiro, supra note 43, at 489–90 (“[T]he hybrid PAE has a greater incentive
to raise the costs of target firms than does the pure PAE.”).
122. In this respect, then, it is fair to say that the competitive effects of diagonal integration differ from the effects that would flow merely from a practicing entity’s market dominance. The practicing entity may be able to charge
a supracompetitive price for its patented product, but the law tolerates this
result to induce the dynamic efficiency benefits on which the patent incentive
is premised. A diagonally integrated NPE as we have defined it, however, imposes welfare losses by raising its rivals’ costs without achieving any of the
procompetitive benefits of vertical integration.

914

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:871

To summarize our model’s results, when a firm like Trebro
becomes a diagonally integrated NPE, the following changes
arise123:
• the royalty demanded for licensing to the downstream rival increases, potentially to a level at
which it is compelled to exit the market (this is
equivalent to enjoining the rival);
• the prices of both downstream products increase, so
that the double marginalization problem actually
grows worse;
• the integrated firm’s output increases, but by less
than the downstream rival’s output falls, so that total output falls overall;
• total welfare falls, as does consumer welfare.
Importantly, the magnitudes of all of these effects are
higher when the downstream products are closer substitutes
(i.e., when downstream competition is more rigorous). At one
extreme, if the products are perfect substitutes then the downstream rival is excluded from the market and welfare is at its
lowest. Additionally, if we make the reasonable assumption
that the downstream rival has some fixed costs to cover, then it
will be excluded by the diagonally integrated NPE even when
the products are close but imperfect substitutes. At the other
extreme, if they are independent products then the above effects shrink to zero, and the diagonally integrated NPE acts
exactly the same as an unintegrated NPE. This is not surprising, because when the downstream products are independent
(meaning they do not compete), then the integrated firm does
not benefit from raising the other firm’s cost, and is thus focused purely on licensing revenue, just like the unintegrated
NPE.
For these reasons, it is clear that diagonal integration poses a serious threat to competition and welfare. The decision in
Trebro thus establishes a dangerous precedent, potentially enabling diagonally integrated NPEs to fully leverage their structural advantage over downstream rivals. That is, by neglecting
to limit the availability of injunctive relief for diagonally inte123. These are the changes in equilibrium variables relative to the case in
which the unpracticed patent is held by a standard unintegrated NPE. See the
appendix for a diagram describing this shift. If the basis for comparison were
instead the case in which the downstream rival owned the patent on its own
input, then the same effects would arise, but the magnitude of each effect
would be even greater.
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grated NPEs claiming infringement of their unpracticed patents, the Trebro decision provides the ultimate leverage needed to maximize the anticompetitive potential of diagonal integration. Given the acute economic hazards posed by this result,
it is particularly concerning that the Federal Circuit neglected
to even consider the competition policy implications of its decision. In our view, such considerations render the Federal Circuit’s position untenable. A better rule would be to limit most
diagonally integrated NPEs to legal remedies, which would limit their ability to charge exorbitant royalties, thereby blunting
the anticompetitive potential of diagonal integration. And, as
our earlier arguments demonstrate, such a rule would frequently promote static welfare without materially undermining
the incentive to innovate.
CONCLUSION
The modern approach to assessing whether an injunction is
warranted in a given case involves a myopic focus on the comparative hardships of the parties and the public at large, as
measured at the time of infringement. This Article proposes a
different approach: we argue that the courts could better appraise the merits of injunctive relief by looking to the time of
invention and asking whether the right to exclude was actually
a necessary quid pro quo for the inventor’s decision to develop
its innovative ideas. This approach aligns judicial decision
making with the patent system’s objective of providing only
those protections that are actually necessary to induce an innovation’s development. In many cases it will be impossible to
make this determination, but we demonstrate that there are a
number of situations in which it can be inferred from the inventor’s actions and the circumstances under which his product entered the market. One such situation involves a plaintiff who is
a diagonally integrated NPE (an NPE who competes with
products reading on its unpracticed patent in a downstream
market) with respect to the disputed patent, and which entered
the downstream product market unprotected from competitors
using the patented article.
Our approach suggests that the Federal Circuit erred in
Trebro by concluding that a plaintiff may be entitled to enjoin
an infringer of its unpracticed patent if it competes with the
disputed technology in a downstream market. This is true even
if, like the plaintiff in Trebro, it entered the downstream market unprotected from competing products using that technolo-
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gy. The approach also sheds some light on a number of important patent topics, including FRAND-encumbered patents,
preemptive patenting, and patent privateering. We also provide
detailed analysis of diagonally integrated NPEs—a business
model that is becoming increasingly common in markets where
patents are regularly bought and sold. Large firms in these industries will commonly acquire large portfolios encompassing
many competing technologies that the acquiring firms do not
intend to use in their own products. We demonstrate that diagonally integrated NPEs are more harmful to welfare than
standard (unintegrated) NPEs. Such a firm’s welfare effects are
similarly more adverse than those that would arise if it were a
practicing entity with respect to the patented article.
APPENDIX: A SIMPLE MODEL OF DIAGONALLY INTEGRATED NONPRACTICING ENTITIES
In this Section, we present a simple model of diagonally integrated non-practicing entities (NPEs) and their effects on
competition and welfare. A diagonally integrated NPE is a firm
who competes in a downstream market, and which holds a patent for an upstream input technology practiced by a downstream rival, but which it does not practice itself. To model
this, we posit a two-tier vertical market structure with differentiated products. There is an upstream market that contains
two distinct technological inputs, U1 and U2, which are subject
to patent protection. These input technologies are used by producers in the downstream market, which contains two (differentiated) competing products, D1 and D2. U1 is an essential
input in D1 (but unused by D2), and so on for U2 and D2. The
upstream firms do not sell physical things, but rather licenses
to use their patented input technologies, and thus there are no
production costs associated with upstream sales. The only cost
of producing a downstream product is that of acquiring the
right to use its essential input, which is sold on a per-unit basis
via a running royalty set by the upstream patent holder.
There are two downstream firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2,
which sell products D1 and D2, respectively. We assume
throughout that Firm 1 holds the patent over U1, so that it is
vertically integrated with respect to U1 (i.e., it is a practicing
entity with respect to U1.) By contrast, Firm 2 does not hold
the patent over U2, but rather must acquire the rights to use it
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from a patent holder (we later consider the case in which Firm
2 owns the patent on U2.) We compare two scenarios. In scenario 1, the patent on U2 is owned by a standard unintegrated
NPE. In scenario 2, Firm 1 becomes a diagonally integrated
NPE by acquiring the patent for technology U2, while continuing to produce only D1. These scenarios are depicted in the diagrams below.

To model downstream competition, we posit a quadratic
two-product utility function representing the preferences of a
representative consumer. We assume that the downstream
products are symmetrically differentiated imperfect substitutes. This utility function is defined by
u(q1,q2) = a(q1 + q2) – 1/2b(q12 + q22 +2sq1q2)
where qi denotes the quantity of downstream good i, a and b
are positive scalars, and s ∈   [0,1] denotes the degree of substitutability between D1 and D2. The values s = 1 and s = 0 correspond to the extreme cases of perfect substitutes and independent products, respectively. The representative consumer
maximizes consumer surplus, given by u(q1,q2) – p1q1 – p2q2
where pi denotes the price of downstream product i. The first
order conditions for q1 and q2 yield the inverse demand functions associated with D1 and D2, respectively.
p1 = a – bq1 – sbq2, p2 = a – bq2 – sbq1
Firms 1 and 2 engage in Cournot competition with differentiated products. Note that Firm 1’s production costs are zero,
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since it owns the patent rights to U1 and thus will not charge
itself a royalty. Firm 2 pays a constant marginal cost of 𝑟 per
unit, which denotes the royalty rate charged by the patent
holder of U2. Firm 1’s downstream profits are thus given by
Π1 = q1(a – bq1 – sbq2), while Firm 2’s profits are given by
Π2 = q2(a – bq2 – sbq1 – r). Taking the first order condition for
each Πi with respect to qi and solving for qi yields firm i’s best
response function. Assuming r is sufficiently low to ensure
nonnegative output by Firm 2, the best responses of Firms 1
and 2 are BR1(q2) = a/2b – sq2/2 and BR2(q1) = (a – r)/2b – sq1/2,
respectively. These generate the following unique NashCournot equilibrium output levels

𝑞1 (𝑟, 𝑠) =

(2 − 𝑠)𝑎 + 𝑠𝑟
,
𝑏(4 − 𝑠 ! )

𝑞! (𝑟, 𝑠) =

(2 − 𝑠)𝑎 − 2𝑟
𝑏(4 − 𝑠 ! )

Using each firm’s profit-maximization first order condition,
it is easy to verify that the corresponding equilibrium prices
and profits are given by
p1(r,s) = bq1(r,s), p2(r,s) = bq2(r,s) + r
Π1(r,s) = bq1(r,s)2, Π2(r,s) = bq2(r,s)2
This fully characterizes the downstream equilibrium as a
function of r. Unsurprisingly, a higher r benefits Firm 1 and injures Firm 2. Firm 1’s output and profits are strictly increasing
in r, while the opposite is true for Firm 2. Both prices are increasing in r, with p2(r,s) > p1(r,s) for all r > 0. By contrast, both
firms are strictly better off when the products are more differentiated: output, price, and profits of each firm are strictly falling in s.1
In scenario 1, the patent on U2 is owned by an unintegrated NPE. This NPE’s objective is simply to maximize its total licensing receipts. Thus the NPE maximizes rq2(r,s). This yields
a unique profit-maximizing royalty rate, r*(s), defined by

1. To see that outputs are decreasing in 𝑠, note that a higher 𝑠 makes
each best response function decrease more rapidly, which causes the equilibrium output profile to shift inward toward the origin.
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(2 − 𝑠)𝑎
4

Given that this royalty is positive and that downstream
competition is imperfectly competitive, there is a double marginalization problem in scenario 1. If instead Firm 2 owned the
patent on U2 (meaning it is vertically integrated, just like Firm
1) then the royalty rate would be zero and the downstream
price would fall, leading to an unambiguous welfare improvement. This is a well-established result of vertical integration,
as noted in Section IV. In scenario 2, Firm 1 owns the patent on
U2, making it a diagonally integrated NPE. Unlike the unintegrated NPE, Firm 1 now cares not only about the revenue derived from licensing to Firm 2, but also about raising its rival’s
costs, which increases its own downstream profits. Thus Firm 1
chooses r to maximize Π1(r,s) + rq2(r,s), leading to a unique
equilibrium royalty rate of r**(s), defined by

8 + 4𝑠 − 2𝑠 ! ∗
𝑟 (𝑠) =
𝑟 (𝑠)
8 − 3𝑠 !
∗∗

r**(s) exceeds r*(s) for all positive s. Thus diagonal integration
leads to a higher royalty rate whenever the downstream products compete. Intuitively, Firm 1’s licensing demand is as low
as the unintegrated NPE’s only when the products are independent, in which case there is no independent value to increasing its rival’s costs. The increase in the royalty rate,
r**(s) – r*(s), is strictly increasing and convex in s. Thus, the
more rigorous the downstream competition, the higher the increase in the royalty rate. In the extreme case of perfect substitutes (s = 1), Firm 1 actually excludes Firm 2 from the market
completely by setting a royalty at which Firm 2 optimally produces zero units. If we made the additional assumption that
Firm 2 has some fixed costs to cover, then there would be some
interval of substitutability levels (s0,1] within which Firm 2
would not operate in scenario 2.2
That r increases upon diagonal integration implies the
2. In particular, this would be the interval of substitutability levels at
which any royalty rate 𝑟 that Firm 2 could afford to pay would lead Firm 1’s
downstream profits to fall by more than 𝑟𝑞! (𝑟, 𝑠).
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prices of both downstream products increase as well. Thus, in
contrast to standard vertical integration, diagonal integration
actually makes the double marginalization problem worse. Like
the royalty rate, the increase in the price of each downstream
good grows larger as s increases. Additionally, Firm 1’s output
expands, but by less than Firm 2’s output falls, creating a net
reduction in total output. Finally, it is easy to verify that total
welfare and consumer welfare both fall. Note that, for any output profile (q1,q2), total welfare is given by u(q1,q2), because all
costs faced by producers are simply transfers made to an upstream patent holder. Letting W(r,s) = u(q1(r,s),q2(r,s)) denote
equilibrium total welfare, it is easy to verify that
∂W/∂r = p1(∂q1/∂r) + p2(∂q2/∂r). Given that p2 > p1 and
∂q2/∂r < –∂q1/∂r < 0 in equilibrium, it follows that ∂W/∂r < 0.
Thus total welfare falls upon diagonal integration. Finally, note
that consumer welfare must also fall, because both downstream
prices increase.

